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Which policies strongly affect long-run growth? Do policies
explain why some poorcoLintries  have stagnated and others have
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The broad lorces behind economic growth-  stagnation of many countries in Africa, Latin
accumulation of produced factors, specialization,  America, and Asia in the 1980s? They discuss
economics of scale, and externalities - were  five national policies:
sketched out by the classical economists long
ago. These same forces have been used in the  *  Fiscal policy. What are the growth effects of
development literature to study various aspects  different types of taxes and public spending (for
of economic growtih.  By building on the insights  example, how do those that affect consumption
ot growth and development economists, the  compare with those that affect investment)?
"new" theoretical literature on growth is also  Does fiscal mismanagement create uncertainty
contributing models that identify specific chan-  that reduces growth?
nels through which national policies may affect  . MonetarY policy. Do countries with high
long-run growth rates. But the empirical work on  inflation tend to grow more slowly? Does the
linking national policies to growth is still evolv-  variance of monetary growth and inflation matter
ing, and many basic issues about the long-run  for growth?
relationshiip  betwecni  policy and growth remain  *  Trade intervention. Do distortionary inter-
unresolved. Among these issues: the effects on  ventions (tariffs and quotas) in foreign trade
growth of goverment  size, trade policy, intema-  affect growth or do they have only one-time
tional capital flows, the allocation of public  level effects? L  es instability in trade and
spending, an  d the linancing of public spending.  exchange rate policy affect growth'?
F  Financial policies. Do penalties on domestic
Easterly, King, Levine, and Rebelo suggest  financial intermediation affect growth? How
that there are important opportunities to empiri-  strong are the effects on growth through lower
cally evaluate the theoretically predicted chan-  investment and those through inefficient alloca-
nels from policy to growth. They contepd that  tion of investment?
researchers should improve the design of cross-  *  Openness toforeign  capital. How do
country studies of growth and should conduct  restrictions on direct foreign investment affect
more detailed longitudinal case studies.  growth'?
Easterly, King, Levine, and Rebelo propose  Their analytical framework is based on the
a research agenda based on the endogenous  simple idea that all factors of production can be
growth literature, designed to address the ques-  increased by investing in human or physical
tions: How do national policies affect long-run  capital. Economic growlh will be related to
growth'? Which policies strongly affect long-run  policies that affect the incentive to invest and the
growth'? Do policies explain why some poor  efficient use of capital and intermediate inputs.
countries have stagnated and others have ad-  Such a framework can be used to consider which
vanced'? Do policies explain successive periods  policies affect the long-run growtih  rate rather
of rapid growth and stagnation in the same  than affecting simply the level of income oncc
country? To what exctent  do national policies - and for all.
ralner than cxternal iniluences - explain the
The I'RE Working Paper  Scries disseminales the find(lings  of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Rcscarch, and Extcrnal
Affai7sG)mplex. An ohje tie .ofthe  erie.s  is to get thesc findings out quickly, cs'cn ifpresentations are lcss than fully polished.
The findings. interpretations. and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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Which policies, if any, strongly affect long run growth?  Do policies explain why some
poor countries have stagnated and others have advanced? Do policies explain successive periods
of rapid growth and stagnation in the same country?  To what extent do national policies--rather
than external influences-explain the stagnation of many countries in Africa, Latin America, a.id
Asia in the 1980's? Ths  paper sets out a research agenda based on the endogenous growth
literature designed to address the question "Do National Policies Affect Long-Run Growth?".
Policy Issues
This paper discusses  five national policies:
(1)  Fiscal  liy.  What are the growth effects of different types of taxes and public spending,
such as those that affect consumption versus those that affect investment? What is the
growth impact of public investment?  Does fiscal mismanagement create uncertainty that
lowers growth?
(2)  Monetarv  2olicv.  Do countries with high infQtion tend to grow more slowly? Does the
variance of monetary growth and inflation matter for growth?
(3)  Trade intervention.  Does distortionary intervention in foreign trade with tariffs and
quotas have growth effects or only one-time level effects? Does instability in trade and
exchange rate policy affect growth?
(4)  Financial policies.  Do penalties on domestic tmancial intermediation affect growth?  How
strong are the effects on growth through lower investment and those through inefficient
allocation of investment?
(5)  Openness to foreign capital. How do restrictions on direct foreign investment affect
growth?
Importance of the Issues
Many of the developing countries have been undergoing adjustment for several years.
Progress has been made, but the recovery of growth has been slow in coming. The critical issue in
the 1990's  will be designing policies to enhance per capita growth. This is necessary both to
improve the standard of living and to service the loans they have received in support of
adjustment efforts. Identifying the critical policies for restoration of growth will help frame policy
recommendations in adjustment loans.
Summar  of analytical framework
This paper's analytical framework is based on the simple idea that all factors of production
can be increased through investment in human or physical  capital.  Economic growth win be
related to policies that affect the incentive to invest and that affect the efficient use of capital and
intermediate inputs.  Suchi  a framework can be used to consider which policies affect the long-run
growth rate, as opposed to affecting the level of income once and for all.2
The framework can also be used to analyze complex interactions among policies and initial
conditions. In a highly distorted economy, a minimum degree of policy reform may be needed to
have anv growth effect. The way policies interact will determine their net effect.  For example,
raising taxes may raise or lower growth depending on whether the taxes are used for government
consumption or investment, whether the taxes penalize private consumption or investment, and
whether the tax is easily evaded such that raising a given amount of revenue is highly
distortionary.
Empirkal  methodoloqy
The analytical framework derives testable predictions regarding the relationship between
the national policies and long-run growth.  We outline a variety of econometric and qualitative
techniques to examine the accuracy  of these predictions and determine which policies are most
important in promoting growth.
We argue that researchers should use fairly aggregate indicators of national policies.  We
recommend this approach for two reasons.  First, in examining a broad collection of policies, it is
not feasible within the context of one study to construct detailed cou"ntr-by-country indicators of
every aspect of fiscal, monetary, trade, international capital, and domestic financial policies. But
one should account for potentially important interactions among national policies, so that it is
important that one include aggregate measures of all of these national policies in a study.
Second, it is of interest whether one can predict the growth performance of countries by
observing commonly used measures of national policies.  If we can use aggregate measures of
national policies to predict growth performance, then these measures will be useful target
indicators in formalizing  policy reform packages.
The empirical methodology described in this paper consists of cross-country and pooled
tests of the theoretical predictions. Although there is a large literature that regresses average
growth rates on various explanatory variables, this approach could extend this literature by (1)
using an analytical framework to consider the broad range of national policies listed above and
interpret the results, (2) conducting sensitivity  analyses to gauge the robustness of the results, and
(3) examining  theoretical predictions that have not been previously  tested.
The research could also examine the relationship between growth and broader measures
of welfare such as social indicators and environmental measures.  Preliminary evidence suggests
high correlation between growth and other welfare measures, but the research could look at what
factors could cause them to diverge.3
The belief  that economic  policy  is a major determinant  of economic  growth  has been
expressed  in the writings  of economists  for over 200  years. Much empirical  work  in the
development  literature has demonstrated  such a Unk.'  For example,  Table 1 shows  how over the
past 30 years,  fast-growing  countries  have  had less government  consumption,  lower  inflation,  kss
of a black market premium,  and more  trade than slow-growing  countries.
TABLE 1
Cross-Country  Averoges:  1960-89
FYatgrow.rs  Slovgrovers
Share  of  investment  in  CDP  0.27  0.17
Secondary  school  enrollment  rates  0.27  0.07
Primry  school  enrollmnt  rates  0.90  0.52
Governsentl  GDP  0.14  0.13
Coare  nt  consumption/  GDP  0.08  0.12
Inflation  rat-  8.42  16.51
Standard  deviation  of inflation  8.75  19.38
Black  mirkat exchag  rate  prmium  4.S5  75.03
Standard  de  tion  of prem  io  6.53  103.69
Shareof  exports  to  GDP  0.44  O.29
Note: mea,  per  c  pits-growth  rate***  -L92
Fsstgrez  a  One-  standard  deviation  greater  than  or  equal  to  the-men
growth  rate.  (cutoff"  4.0S  n-ia)
Slovgroverst  Ona-standard  deviation  luea  than.  or  equal.  to  the  mean  growth
Tate.  (cutoff  -. 0.2;  n-I5)
However,  the nature of the relationship  between policy  and growth  is far from settled.
Controversy  continues  on which  policies,  if any, have  growth  effects  as opposed to one-time
effects  on the level  of income. For example,  some  authors have argued  that policies  that induce
distortions  are relatively  unimportant  because  they have only  one-time  effects  on income  that
seldom  amount to more than a few  percentage  points (e.g. Rodrik (1990)). Others question the
causality  of the relationship  between  the policy  variables  and growth  of the type shown  in Table 1.
Substantial  controversy  remains  as to which  policies  explain  relative  successes  and failures,  and to
what extent external  factors  play  a role relative  to national  policies. Other doubts  exist  whether
the relationship  between  policy  variables  and growth  is the simple  linear  one usually  assumed,  or
is more complex,  with thresholds  for effective  minimum  reforms.
1 'Appdz  I pnxd  a Mbdet  survey  ofthe  itertume.  A  moen  mtecmisuvey  an be found in Radt  (1990).4
A.  Growth experience of developing countries
The issue of which policies affect long-run growth has become especially critical as many
developing countries seek to reestablish (or in some cases, establish for the first time) conditions
for growth in the 1990's, after the poor record of the 1980's.
1.  Experience over 1965288
Table 2 presents growth rates for 1965-89  and 1980-89 for different country classifications.
Three important facts stand out: (1) growth rates over the last 25 years vary widely across
countries and regions; (2) developing countries have not in general grown more rapidly than
developed countries over the last 25 years; (3) the 1980's was a disastrous decade for many
developing countries.  Sub-Saharan Africa stands out with a poor growth record on all counts,
East Asia with an outstanding growth record.  However, wide divergences exist among countries
in the same region.  This record suggests that large variation in growth rates across countries
needs to be explained; it is critical to understand the extent to which national policies can do so.
Table 2 also presents some ranges of growth rates for growth in socialist countries,
illustrating the uncertainty surrounding socialist economic performance.  The high valt:zs of
estimates imply respectable performance, which has been interpreted by some to support the
conclusion that high distortions (such as those induced by planning) do not have growth effects. 2
The low estimates imply a strong effect of distortions, since investment rates for most of these
countries were very high.
Preliminary analysis  of developing country data indicates some suggestive regularities.  We
find that growth over time is not very stable-the  correlation for growth in countries acroae
successive  5-year periods is low. 3 Moreover, poorer countries have more unstable growth rates,
which may be related to greater policy instability in the poorest countries. The nigh variance of
growth rates is at least suggestive that relatively frequent changes in policy may help explain
changes in growth rates over successive  periods (and possibly that uncertainty itself depresses
growth). We will discuss the analysis  of the lack of persistence in growth rates below.
2.  Lone-run emerience
While this project will focus mainly on the recent period for which most of the data is
available, a longer-run perspective is also helpful.  Figure 1 shows some estimates of long-run
growth (since 1870) in developing and developed countries for which long time-series are
available. The striking fact that emerges from this graph is that growth is much more unstable for
2Luca  (1988). However,  opinion  seems  to be  swingiing  towards  lower  estimates.  IECSE  is conducting  research on the  estimation  of
growth  in  socialist  countria  in tansition.
3The  crs-peiod  estikme  ar  genealy  below  .4 and in many  cas  below  .2 (these  results  arm  iable in Levine  and  Relt
(1990b)).5
Table  2
Growth  rates  of output  per  capita,  1965  to 1989
GDP  per capita
Annual  averages
Country  group  1965-89  198n-89
Low-  and  middle-Incomn  economies  1.4%  0.1%
Low-income  economies  0.5%  -0.2%
Middle-income  economies  2.1%  0.3%
Sub-Saharan  Afrlca  0.6%  -0.5%
Highest  - Botswana  9.4%  7.8%
Lowest  - Niger  -3.2%  -4.8%
East  Asia  4.1%  3.6%
Highest  - Korea  7.7%  8.2%
Lerwest  - Philippines  1.1%  -1.8%
South  Asia  1.7%  2.3%
Highest  - Pakistan  2.3%  3.0%
Lowest  * Bangladesh  0.1%  0.8%
Latin  America  anr the  Caribbean  1.0W  -1.2%
Highest  - 60-89  Brazil,  80-89  Colombia  4.2%  1.3%
Lowest  - Nicaragua  -1.8%  -3.9o
OECD  2.6%  2.0%
H:ghest  - Japan  4.5%  3.4%
Lowest  - 65-89  New  Zealand,  80-89  Netherlands  1.2%  1.4%
Socialist  economies  (low  range,  high  range)  Low  High
China  (1965-88)  5.4%
Algeria  (1965-88)  2.7%
Yugoslavia  (196548)  3.4%
Czechoslovakia  (1948488)  0.8%  3.5%
Hungary  (1948-88)  1.7%  5.1%
Poland  (1948488)  -0.1%  3.6%
Bulgaria  (1948.80,1948-88)  2.8%  5.5%
Soviet  Union  (1960-85)  1.6%  4.5%
Average  of last  5 socialist  economies  1.4%  4.4%
All  averages  are  unweighted.  Oil-dominated  countries  have  been  excluded.
Sources:
Non-socialist  economies  taken  from  WDR  1990  and  upc,.ed 1989  with  World  Bank  data
Socialist  economies  as follows:
Algena  - from  Summers  and  Heston  (1988)
China  - from  Statistical  Yearbook  of China  1984.
Yugoslavia  - from  Statistical  Yearbook  of the  SFRY,  vareous  years
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Bulgaria  - from  Fischer  and  Gelb  (1990),
UN  (1948),  and  WOR  1990.
Soviet  Union  - High  rate  is from  official  numbers,  and  low  rate
is  from Selyunin  & Khanin  (1987).6
developing countries than for developed countries. 4 Most of the developing countries show
distinctive starts and stops in their pattern of development.  The mc-nt  famous case, Argentina,
grew slightly above the OECD average over 1870-1913,  but has lagg, d well behind ever since
(with a particularly alarming  decline after 1973). Ghana had respectable growth in 1913-50,  then
lagged badly in 1950-73,  and finally  went into catastrophic negative growth after 1973 (from which
it is now recovering).  Of the  1I developing countries shown, only 2 show reasonably steady
growth -- Brazil and Colombia. Aside from the disruption of wars and other exogenous shocks, it
is plausible that changes in policy regimes had much to do with shifts in growth performance.  By
contrast, the greater steadiness of growth in developed countries may reflect a more stable policy
regime.
For othet developing countries, there is some doubt whether sustained per capita growth
has ever taken place. The incisive  study of Reynolds (1985) concluded that per capita growth had
noi begun in 7 out of the 40)  countries he was analyzing.' The 1990 Woirld  Development Report
defines the level of 'extreme poverty" as US$275 per capita consumption in 1985 PPP prices,
while USS370 per capita defines simple "poverty".  According to data from Summers and Heston
(1988), there are 8 countries below the extreme poverty line, while there are another  14 countries
below the upper po%erty  line.'  If we assume that the po"^rty line (or the extreme poverty line)
approximates the range of minimum  subsistence income, this would imply that income in these
countries today is not much different from what it was in the distant past.'  Government policies
may help to explain why countries have failed to grow. The analysis  of the growth-poverty
r.elation  will be discussed in a later section.
B.  Contribution  to knowledge  of policy-related issues
If specific policies help explain a significant portion of the substantial differences in long-
run growvth  shown here (and thus huge differences in per capita income), this should help
convince even th - most reluctant statesman to adopt reforms.  As Robert Lucas said, "The
consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one
starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else." 8
Whether policy has growth effects has long been a controversial issue.  In the traditional
neoclassical  framework, based on the work of Solow, policies have an effect only in the transition
after a policy  change, not in the long run.  Recent theoretical models have extended the Solow
model by endogenizing technological change, making it either another form of capital or
4The only eceptions  to the steady  growth pattemn  of the  develped  countties are Japan and Spain. both of whom  made the tansition
from  developing  to deveped  countries over  the perod shown.
5 The countries wer Afghanisan, Banglade.  Ethopia, Moambique, Nepal, Sudn. and Zaimes
6The  "extremely  pooe countries  are  Zaire, Chad,  Ethiopia,  Somalia,  Malaswi,  Tanzania,  Ghana, and Rwanda,  while the "pooe countries
arm  Zambia,  Burundi  Uberia,  Niger,  Burkina Faso,  Guinea, Uganda,  Angola,  Mal, Sierra Leone,  Central  African Republic, Togo, Kenya,
and Nigeria.  It is significant  that all of these countries are  in Afrka,  suggesting  there  are region-wide  factor  that need to be consudcred,
as wil be done in one of the proposed  case studies dcsu ibed below.
7  This argument was suggeted by Lant Pritchett
8Lucas  (1988), p. S.7
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hypothesizing  spillovers from physical and human capital investments. In the simple model that we
use in this paper. all factors of production can be accumula-.ed.  Such a model implies long-run
growth effects both from the overall incentive to accumulate capital (related to overall taxes,
macroeconomic  stability,  etc.) and from distortion of resource allocation.  In this model, fiscal,
monetary. trade, and financial policies can affect the level and efficiency if  factor accumulation
and thus steady-state growth rates. 9
C.  Empirical  methodokly
An important and influential strand of empirical research on economic growth has focused
on "growth accounting":  estimating the proportion of growth attributable to changes in labor and
capital inputs, with the residual assumed to represent total factor productivity growth.  This paper
proposes a different approach. Instead of analyzing  the "factor sources of growth", this agenda
suggests analyzing  the "policy  sources of growth".
The framework  we set out yields testable implications regarding each policy and also
illustrate the implications for growth of interactions among policies.  Research could investigate
the predictions from tLeory in an effort to better understand the relationship between national
policies and long-run gro-  h.
There is also a substantial literature using cross-country and time-ser;es analyses to search
for empirnal links between long-run growth rates and economic, political, and institutional
variables." 0 It is difficult to compare effects of policies from this literature, since authors study
different sets of countries, over different years, use different explanatory variables, measure policy
indicators differently, and employ different data sets.  In addition, most investigators consider only
6 small number of explanatory variables in attempting to establish a statistically significant
relationship between growth and a particular variable of interest.  For example, many authors who
examine the relationship between fiscal policy and growth omit variables measuring trade and
monetary policies,  while authors who study the importance of trade policy commonly omit fiscal
and international frnancial  policy variables.
Thus, we suggest a number of extensions. First, test a set of hypotheses emerging from a
common frameworl.  Second, by compiling  a comprehensive data base, compare new findings to
past findings anJ discover the sources of important discrepancies. This will help extract the most
reliable infercrnces. Third, consider a broad range of national policies.  This will allow one to
quantify which national policies are most important in determining growth and to address
important interactions among policies. Fourth, conduct detailed sensitivity analyses to gauge the
confidence one should have in the findings and to uncover new areas for economic research."
9 However,  the coequenc  of the level  effets  in the neclasicl  model  approach the growth  effectr of the "new"  models  as the capital
share becomes large
'0Appendt I  oontan  a survey  of the theortical and empirical  gwth  literature.  See  also the revies by Chenezy,  Robinson,  and
Syrquin  (1986),  Chapter  I and Lerine  and Renelt  (1990b).
ttSee the orinal  wor by Learer (198s)  and Its  appication  to growb  by Levine  and Rendt (1990a).10
D.  Relevance of the agenda to policy
The present  model  used  by most World Bank  economists  assumes  a linear relationship
between  investment  and growth  (the incremental  capital-output  ratio--ICOR). The ICOR is often
assumed  to improve  (i.e. decline)  in response  to reforms  such as trade or financial  liberalization.
Although  often criticized  for the lack  of a clear theoretical  foundation,  the ICOR model  is a
useful  first approximation  to capture the link between  investment  and growth. However,  it gives
little guidance  to evaluate  what kind of reforms  are likely  to raise growth  for a given  investment
rate, or what the magnitude  of such growth  effects  might  be.  It also omits the effect of changes
in the level and efficient  allocation  of human  capital. Research  could  make a uwful contribution
by providing  a framework  to explicitly  connect  policies  to efficiency  and growth.11
Box 1:. MUMw  M olgrg!
We generally  assume  that GDP is the appropriate  measure  of national  output, and.
that it is measwured  correctly  in the available  data.  However,  we should.  take note of
serious  measurement  issues  that have  been raised  inthe  literature,  and use exsting.work-
in the fie!4to avoid.  drawing  conclusions  based:on'spurious  growth  in output.
One difficulty  that has been mentioned  in the literature  is  that GDP is uncorrected:
for depreciation of capital assets and depletion of 'natural  resources (International.:
Economics  Department  (1989),  Ahmad  et.al. (1989)) Data on depreciation  and depletion:.
are generally  scant for developing  countries,  ..and definitional issues are: formidable.
Nevertheless,  a few  rough  corrections  could  be made. For example,  it has been noted that
output growth  in oil producing  countries  is biased.  since extraction  of.  oil is essentially  .
conversion of  an  asset into cash rather  than  true  production.  Takdng this  and
environmental  degradation  into account,  Repetto et. al. (1989)  lowered  the estimate  of:
growth  in Indonesia  from  7 percent to 4 percent over 1971-84.  In cases  where countries
with large mineral  sectors  are being  studied,  the-project  will  examine  growth  in the non-
mineral  sector  to see how  much  it differs  from the usual growth  estimates.
Another problem  with measurement  of both levels and growth  rates of GDP is.
changes  in relative  sectoral  prices across  countnes and over time. Drastically  different
relative prices or  misaligned  exchange.  rates: makes dollar GDP incomparable.  across
countries  -. this problem  has been-addressed.in:the..International  Compatisons  Project.
(Summers  and Heston (1988)). A similar  problem  is that constant-price  growth  rates in
a single  country  are not robust  to changes  in the base  year, since  the weighting  of different  .
sectors can change drastically  with a change in-the.  base .year (Azam, Guillamont,  and..
Guillamont  (1988)). In the countries  we.analyze,we  will.look  at the robustness  of growth:
rates and income  levels  across  different  methodologies.
The results  from a research  agenda  like this should  be helpful  in evaluating  long-run
growth  effects  of adjustment  packages.  Although  the importance  of long-run  growth  is universally
acknowledged,  little analytical  effort is spent on evaluating  the growth  consequences  of policies
relative  to their short-run  macroeconomic  impacts. It is weil  known  that policies  to reduce
macroeconomic  imbalances  could  reduce long-run  growth. For example,  many  debtor countries
followed  the combination  of raising  import  taxes and reducing  public  infrastructure  investment  in
response  to the cutoff  of external  financing  after 1982  even though it may  well have reduced
growth  potential  ((Corbo  et al. (1987),  Easterly  (1989),  Sachs (1990)).
This research  would  also  contribute  to the academic  debate on the size and sign  of the
long-run  effects  of macroeconomic  adjustment  anu structural  reforms  (e.g. Rodrik (1990),  Sachs12
(1987)). The bringing together of a diverse group of academic economists and Bank staff should
generate fresh insights into the relationship between policy and growth.
U1. Desigg of the research aeenda
The strategy followed in the agenda is to set out and test the simplest possible framework
under which policies have growth effects.  This framework generally has unambiguous predictions
as to which policies have growth effects, and the sign of those effects.  We recognize that the
framework leaves out  numerous interactions that may complicate the relationships set out here.
Indeed, whole branches of macroeconomics,  public finance, international trade, and finance are
devoted to anablzing the magnitude and signs of most of the effects predicted here.  Nevertheless,
we argue that the broad brush treatment given by the framework of this agenda is a useful
starting point.  The policymaker  and country economist do not have the luxury of analyzing
effects in isolation but must evaluate a set of policies together.  For this, a simple framework is
needed if the analysis is not to quickly  become intractable.
A. Analytical framework
In this section, we set out a theoretical framework relating specific policies to growth. We
present first policies that affect growth by affecting the level of investment, then policies that
affect the efficiency  of investment. Some of the policies enumerated above affect both the level
and efficiency  of investment, and will be discussed in both sections.
1.  Policies that affect incentives to capital accumulation
We first present a model in which the level of investment is the only economic variable
that affects long-run growth --  we abstract from any investment allocation issues. Policies in this
framework alter growth by affecting the level of investment.
We assume that output (Y) is proportional to "capital"  (K), which is broadly defined to
include physical and human capital: 12
(1)  Y=AK
The coefficient A is assumed not to vary either over time or across countries.  Labor implicitly
enters the model tbrough K, since human capital is utilized only to the extent that people are in
the labor force and are employed. That is, if k is human capital per person and N is number of
employed persons, then the component of K due to human capital is equal to kN.
We assume an economy  closed to inflows  or outflows of capital, so the rate of saving and
1
2
flb  production functon was  suggested  by Rebelo (1991),  and  used In the work of Barm (1990, 1991)  and King  and Rebelo (1990).It
bean a resemblance  to the linear output-capital modds long used in the  development Iitentumc13
the rate of investment are equal.'  If the economywide  rate of accumulation of new capital (and
saving) is a fixed proportion of olwput, i, then growth of output g will be given bvy
(2)  g = iA - aS
where 6 is the rate of depreciation of capital.  We should stress again that investment, i, is
broader than the conventional defnition  since we include also human capital accumulation." 4
We see that growth depends only on the economywide level of investment, i, and the
technologically  fixed parameters, A and 6.
We are omitting an explicit description of how population growth enters the model,
although it will be included in the empirical implementation.'  Since population growth is
considered to be exogenously  fixed for the purposes of this proposal, it does not affect the policy-
growth relationships we set out whether we interpret growth as per capita or gross output
growth.' 6
Since growth depends only on investment, we need to analyze how policy affects
investment  We assume that economic agents maximize  the present value of their future welfare
extending indefinitely into the future.  This is a useful first approximation to the plausible notion
that investors must be rewarded with adequate returns to their capital in order to willingly
postpone consumption." 7 With investment responding in this way, the common growth rate of
output, consumption, and capital will then be given by:
L 3 ThIs asumption will  be mainutined throughout the analysis cpt  for the consideration of direct foreign  lnvestmenL  Tbe  umptiMon
of a closed capital market doea not rule out capital flows  such  as official credits, aid, or rationed commercial loans which can be eas
accomodated  in this framework.  Few developing  economies  arm  integrated  with international capital markem so the simplifying  asumption
of a closed capital market seems reasonable.  For those that are open, the model would need to incorporate complications such as
adjustment costs of invemenLt Similar cffects of poliy obtain in such an open capital market model (details available upon request.
14lhi creates a potential measurement  problem for "investment,"  to which  we propose several imperfect but workable solutionL One
is to try to directy measure human capital investment (such as education and health spending); this wiil generally only be possible in
resticted smpkl  Another is to asume that in the long run, the polices we are consideing do not affect the composition of invtment
between  human and physial capital this is restrictive,  but permits the use of the conventional invetment rate as a prmsy  for all investment.
Fully,  other proxies for human capital investment can be used, such as enrollment rates and health indicatos  We will  _teimeat with
all three approaches and teat applicable restrictions  In cas  where the measurement problems prove insuperable,  we can still use the
reduced form relation between growth and poicies to be presented next.
t 51f labor supply  is ewogenous.  then it will  grow with population  To see the effect of population growth on per capita output goth,
we noed to make an assumption  about the degree of splllwer of capital acos  generations If there is complete  spilover (so that each new
peron  is endo  with the cisting  average, k), then population growth is neutra  - there is no effect on per capita growth of higber
population grwth.  If there is zero or kla than complete spiLkawer.  then higher population growth lowem per capita output growth.
1 6rfhem  is a rich literature on economic  determinants of fertility nd population growb (see, for eacmple, Birdsal (1989)). We omit
the potential feedback from policy to population growth in order to Ulmit  the scope of the proposal. assuming that such feedback effects
are small in comparion  to the direct policy  effec  on growth that we analye
1 7EvAe=  on the response of saving to rates of return is inconclusive  (see Gerovitz  (1988) and Schmidt-Hebbed.  Webb and Corei
(1990)).14
(3)  g = (A -6 -p)/o
where p  is the rate of discount and l/a is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.8
Growth is given by the difference between the net rate of return on capital (A-3) and the
rate of discount  p, times the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  The higher is the rate of
return to capital, the higher is growth.  Since many policies affect how much of the return to
capital investors can retain, this will be the channel through which such policies affect growth.
a. Fiscal  policy
We consider first a universal tax on income, r.  The after-tax rate of return to capital
becomes A(1-r), so growth will be given by:
(4)  g =  (A(1-r)  - 6  -p)/o
The model makes a simple, testable prediction: growth is negatively and linearly related to the
income tax rate, with coefficient -A/a.  This assumes that the revenues from the tax are not used
for anything that itself increases the economy's capital, such as government investment. It also
assumes that the tax cannot be evaded.  Since government capital and tax evasion both affect the
efficiency  of investment, the implications  of these will be explored in the next section.'
We next note that a tax on output, such as a sales tax of rate t, will have the same effect
as an income tax in this frameworlk An output tax applied to investment purchases will imply a
net rate of return of Ai(1+t).  Thus, an output tax shifts down the net rate of return the same
way an income tax does.'
However, if the sales tax on output applies only to consumption, then there will be no
growth effect.  Since no tax is paid on investment, there is no effect on the rate of return, and
t 1We arc auuming  that aU  individuals  have  identical  preferenc, so we are abstracting  from the savings  and investment  effecta  of
distributional  shifts  strcued by,  e.g, Taylor  (1983).
"9Note  that if the tax mrvenues  are implicitly  or aplicity transfenred  back  to consunmrs,  the tax would  not affect  the overall  nte  of
saving  and investment  if private vng were  a fixed  ratio  to private  income.  However,  with  endogenous  investment  and saving,  the growth
effecs  of higher  taxes  are the same  readle  of whether  the tmvenucs  from  the tax  are conumed by the govenment,  transferd  bk
to cosumers  or otherwise  wastd  .
2AAn  output  tax  of rate t is  equivalt  to an income  tax  of rate t/(l +t).1S
thus no effect on growth.  This model makes the strong prediction that taxing investment
(through a general income or output tax) lowers growth, while taxing consumption does not."
The implication that investment taxes harm growth while consumption taxes do not could
also be examined with cross-country  data on the price of investment goods and consumption
goods from Summers and Heston (1988), since prices can be assumed to reflect implicit taxes.  De
Long and Summers (1990) have put the relative price of producers' durables into a cross-section
growth regression.  Their finding that a low price of producers' durables is associated with high
growth is suggestive. We suggest exploring these results further with disaggregated data on
relative prices of different types of investment goods, and by separating out the effects of
investment prices and consumption prices.
b.  Monetary  policy
Monetary policy in developing countries is often driven by the financing needs created by
the public sector deficit.'  The inflation created by monetary growth operates as a tax on
holdings of money.  It is reasonable to suppose that money is used to purchase investment goods,
and money must be held for some minimum  period to make the transaction. Inflation will thus act
like an output tax on investment purchases, and the effects on growth will be essentially
equivalent to those described for the output tax in the previous section:
(5)  g =  (A/(1  +Br)-6-p)/a
where a  is the inflation rate and B is a parameter reflecting the average length of time that
money must be held in advance of investment transactions.  Thus we have the strong prediction
that there is a negative relationship between growth and inflation.'
This representation of the long-run growth effects of monetary policy as equivalent to a
marginal tax is no doubt too simple. As we will examine in the next section, inflation may cause
resources to shift between sectors. In addition, the effect of monetary policy will depend on fiscal
policy decisions,  so that it is impossible  to treat them separately.  With both income taxes and the
inflation rate, the growth relationship becomes
(6)  g =  A(1-r)/(l+&)  P  p  -
a
217he  rltive  vetit ot comumption and income tae  been etensively debated in the pubik finance Literature  wvthin  the eontest
of the trditional  neoclasicl  model (see Atkinso  and Stiglitz  (1980) for a discunion).  Note that the strong condusion of no  roth
effea  of consumption tam  would be overturned if labor supply were highly responsive to real wages and the  revenues from  the
consumption  tax  were  completely  transfered back  to taxpaye  Our  hypotbesis  depends  on the joint  probability  of thene  two  cmnditi
being  low.
VTbe  consisten  rltion  betwen government  revenue,  spending  bonWng, g  h and the inlati u  is stressed  by  and and
van Wijnbergen  (1969)  and van Wljnbergen  (1989).
23l  is anakogou  to resuts obtained  for  the neoclaca  model  by  Stocknan  (1981). See alo  Mino  (1990).16
ar .2 Hm  doe  awh  bek?  WhY  does  aWh  d?
It  ao  useful  to conside model  In which growth may not tak, pace a all becaus.of bad policies. 
mentioned  In th  Intoduction, not aft deveoplng oounbtes  show ovidonco ofu  sutaned  per capita growth.. Oter
economies  that previosly  had experienced  growth  seem  to have  ground  to a halt In the sat decades  (for example
weee  zero  percopita growthfor  Argentina  196  . Nigeria  1960w47, nd the Philippines  197546). We presnh
some  basic  models  in which  policy  detwminee  not  only  the  vevsl  of growth,  but  whethr growth akes  plabe  ta,  (Se
o N*eson  (156).  Azariadis  and Drazen(199g),  Becker,  Murphy, andTzurm  (1000, Murphy,  Slhbro  andVihn
(198),  RPbslo  (1U90M  and EastEdy  j19U0
a. Economies  with povert  tra
In,  otlon HlAI, we asumed thsC  othr  things equal,  all countis  should  have  the sao  saving rats. h
reality  poor countries,  In  paiular  those  wth Inoonme  level  nar  th  poverty  lne, tnd  to have  very  low rates  of  aving.
This phnme  cn  besaily  capturd by introducing  Into  th  utili  function  the eubtn*  evedof  consumption,
such  that swngs  goe  to zeo as income  approaches  subsistence.  This formulation  makes  th  rats of sangs  vwy.
inelastic  when the level of Income  is nsa  *ubsitence  The growthrat  of Irncom for an eonorm  witih  01_he
prefereno  is:
(1)  9=A  (1-)
wherex is the  capital stock  tht  Is oonsient wih  the subsistnce consumption  level. In developed oonombss  the
term  ,/K Is does to zero  and so th  rats of growth  Is basically  that given by equation (4).
Policie  that increae  r  in such a way that A(t-r)  < p+6  will make  the econony convergo  towad  th
'poverty trp'  x. Onco the  capital  stock is near  r  a policy change  that mako. A (1-r) > p+  will lad  the eoonomy
to expnd.  Butth  recoveryp  roces can be veryslow.  it can tak  aong  time forthe raofexpin  to Increase
signIfantly  and tho brush  with poverty  will  ave  permanent  tears. A period In which  l  is temporarily  high will make
ft  Income  level  In the economy  permanently  lowe.
b.  Model  with fixed factor
So far we have  asumed that fixed factors  do not enter  into productio.  However a*  model In which fixed
factors  bcome unimportant  only  at hIgher  Income  level, which seems  broadly  plusble  in light of modem  induWtrial
development,  would giv  similar  ruts.  Jons  and Manuelil  (1990yhav proposed  a production  function of  thsilype,
ThI  model  ha  the interetng property  that policy  can  caus  an economy  to be  tuck in zero  perOapa growth,  where
fixedfactorsproventgrowthatheydonth  SolowrmodeL  Thiswould  happenIfthtaxrats  oran equivalepnt poenalt
on capital  accumulatlon  is hIgh. A low  tendency  to save  and/or high rate  of population  growth  would make  the  zero
growth  equilibrium  more  likely.
The Intuiion behind  thertaturo of the-zero  growth-trap nth.JoneeManuelli  modal  la stralghtfoward.  A
the  captal-labor ratio  rim,  tho  after-tax  marginal  product  of captai will gradually  decline  to a consant which depens
on the technology  and on tho level  of the tax rate.  if this consta  (e  minimum  after-tax  rate  of rturm to capit  Is
greater  than  the sum of the populatIon  growth  rate  and tho rate  of discount,  then  consumersc  wHI  find ft worthwhlls  to
keep  inreasing t  captalbor  ratio,  and growth  will  ue.  if th  conditon dor  not hold (becaus  otaxes  hiGh,
for exampe, thn  consumer.wil  Ot  hv  sufficnt  lncne  to indefinitely  raise  capiaWabor  ratio, and  output
per workerwil stagnate; Thits  a simiar result  to th  model  of section  a. although  hers  stagnation  could  lake phaoc.
at any Income evel, not  lus  at subsistence  Income.
Both  of  th  mods  d this ectoon  imply inequaliWee  involving  the t  rate,  which  sugg99t an important  poli0y
lon.  A mInlmumnthrfthold  for reformmav  be noeded  to haw anv elfoct  on arowth.17
This indicates that the growth effects of inflation are smaller, the larger is the fiscal tax rate, and
vice versa.  Given these complexities,  individual  researchers will be encouraged to look also at
interaction terms between inflation and other policy indicators, as well as at alternative measures
of monetary policy.
2.  Policies that affect efficiency of resource allocation
In this section, we consider policies that affect the efficiency of investment.  In other
words, the policies considered here have an effect on growth even if investment is unchanged.
These results are particularly interesting because they challenge the common presumption that
efficiency  matters only for the level of income, not for the rate of growth in the long run. If we
consider the reduced form relation between growth and policy for the policies in this section, the
relationships will generally be nonlinear, unlike the simple linear relationships implied by the
policies in the previous section.
We need to generalize the model of section 1 to consider two types of capital K, and K 2:
(7)  Y =  A  F(KI,K2)
where A is a technologically  fixed parameter and F is a function capturing how the two types of
capital can be combined to produce output.  We assume that this function displays all the usual
properties: constant returns to scale and a diminishing  marginal product of each input.  Note that
any policy that affects the two types of capital the same way will have the same effects as those
described in the previous section.  However, we want to consider policies that penalize one of the
types of capital relative to another.
The two types of capital will be given various interpretations depending on the policy
described. We will assume that the relative price of the two types of capital is fixed (at unity),
either because they represent two alternative uses of the same good, or because they are traded
internationally. In the absence of any policy  intervention, producers in competitive markets would
equate the marginal products of the two types of capital:
(8)  F, = F 2
Using (8), we can solve for the ratio of K, to K 2 and rewrite (7) as follows:
(9)  Y = AOK
where K is the total value of the two types of capital (=K,+K.),  and 0 is a function of the
parameters of the function F, reflecting the efficient allocation of capital.
In the fixed rate of investment case, the rate of growth will be given by:
(10)  g = iAo ^ais
where i is the sum of the investments made in the two types of capital goods.'  Note that growth
now depends on the effi:iency parameter 0, even though A is still rixed.
If the rate of investment is endogenous, then growth will be given by the following:
( 11)  8g = (F2  -a  -p)lor
Growth will respond to the net marginal product of capital (we could put the marginal product of
either type of capital, since they are equal according to (8)), as in the previous model.
These growth equations are the same as before, with the exception of the efficiency
parameter 4.  Policies that penalize one type of capital relative to another will lower this
parameter and result in lower growth, even if investment is unchanged.  Growth would also fail
with endogenous investment, since the social rate of return to capital will fall with distortionary
policies.
a. Fiscal  policy
i.  Differenial taxes
We consider now a tax that applies to some types of capital goods but not others.  One
example would be given where K, is interpreted to be human capital and K 2 physical capital, and T
is a tax that applies to labor income (income from human capital) but not to profits (income from
physical  capital).  Another example would be where income from capital in the formal sector (K,)
is visible to the tax authorities and subject to tax, whereas income from capital in the informal
sector (K2) can be hidden from the authorities and evades the tax.  In any case of this type, the
after-tax marginal products of the two types of capital will be equated:
(12)  (1-r) F 1 = F2
The tax introduces inefficiency,  because it induces too much of the second type of capital
to be held, and too little of the first type. Thus, higher differential taxes will induce lower growth
both for a given rate of investment, and in a reduced form relation where investment is
endogenous. In terms of the equations above, the efficiency parameter  i  will be a negative
(generally nonlinear) function of the tax rate:
(13)  g= A0(r)  i -c  50<0
This model would suggest an equation considerably different from that usually tested in the
literature: there would be an interaction term between the investment rate and a nonlinear
function of the tax rate.
The after-tax rate of return to capital (either (1-r)F, or F2) will fall, inducing lower growth
also when investment is endogenous as in (11):
24We  oontinue  to uasune  a  cloed  capital  miet  so  that Imvstment  equab  saving.  If the  capita market  we fully  open  and  there  Pee
adjautmt  csa to invment  in the two  goods  we  would  get  similar  policy  effecs to those  discussd beklw.19
(14)  g =  (F2(r)  - a  p)la  F2'<O
The testable hypothesis  is that a tax rate applying only to some investment goods but not to
others lowers growth, both for a given rate of investment and when the investment rate is chosen
optimally.
For example, with a CES function with a high elasticity of substitution, the relationship
between the rate of tax and growth is that shown in figure 2.2  The efficiency implications of the
tax rate (i.e. the effect on growth with a fixed investment rate) at first are small, then increase
sharply as the tax rate rises. This shape also has the interesting implication that growth stays
above a certain minimum no matter how high the tax rate, which reflects the possibility of
substituting away from the highly  taxed input.  Since the curve is flat at high tax rates, this implies
a certain minimum threshold reduction in taxes must be achieved to have a significant growth
effect when one starts with a high tax rate.
The relation between output and income taxes is analogous to the previous section.  A
sales tax which applies to investment purchases of type I capital goods, but not type 2 capital
goods, will act the same as a tax on income from type 1 capital. 2'  Thus, a sales tax on formal
sector purchases that can be evaded in the informal sector will have the same efficiency-lowering
effects as the income tax above.
The results for consumption taxes are also analogous to the previous section.  A tax that
distorts consumption decisions has no effect on growth in this model, because it does not affect
the ailocation of investment. Thus, a sales tax that applies only to some consumption goods and
not others, while lowering the efficiency  of consumption and harming consumer welfare, would
not lower the rate of growth in the long run.
ii.  Public spending  financed with distortionary  taxes
An inadequate level of essential public capital--such as roads, telephones, water supply
systems,  etc.--is also a distortion affecting efficiency of resource use.  If such public capital can
only be financed by distortionary taxes of the type discussed in the previous section, then one has
a complex tradeoff between the two distortions.
The production function could be expanded to be:
(15)  Y=A  F(K 1 , K 2,K.)
where Kg  is government capital. The parameter on Kg  in this equation will vary across countries or
regions if the productivity  of government capital varies (this can be tested in the pooled time-
series regressions). We assume govemment capital is financed with a fixed share ss of the
251be  nictur  shown  is  with an elasticity  of substitution-3. While  a high  elasticity  may  seem  unreasonable  in an economy  with only
2 capial goods,  with many  capit  goods  it is liky  that  thee am  cose  substitutes  to any  capital  good  that u taxed.  his  model
only  2 yp"a  of inputs  for simpliidty.  With multiple  capital  inputs,  there  could  be multiple  tax  differentials.  A decrease  in one  tax  trte in
isolbtion  could  increase  the  overall  level  of distortion  (for an  erample,  see  Easterly  (1990c)).
2&lis equivalence  is noted  in Atiknson  and  Stiglitz  (1980).20
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revenues  from a tax on formal  sector income,  to use the example  from the previous  section. If
we reinterpret total capital  K from equation  (9) as including  government  capital  K. then the
efficiency  parameter  0 and the marginal  product  of private  capital F 2 will  be a positive  function  of
the share of productive  government  spending  s.  Efficiency  v will  be a positive  function  of r at
low  levels  of the tax rate and a negative  function  at high levels.  At a low  level of taxes,  the
marginal  product  of new public  capital  will  generally  be higher than the distortionary  loss  of
output caused  by the tax, while  the opposite  will  be true at high levels.
This implies  the following  equation  for growth  with a given  investment  rate:
(16)  g-A  O(r,s)  i - a  ol  > 0 at lowT, 01 <0  at highr,  02 >  °
The testable  prediction  is that growth  for a fixed  investment  rate is higher, the higher the share of
government  revenue going  to productive  investment,  and is related nonlinearly  to the tax rate.
With  endogenous  investment,  the equation  becomes:
(17)  g = (F(r,sd)  - 6 *  p)-o  F2,>O  at low  r, F2,<O at high r, F22>0
Growth  is nonlinearly  related to the tax rate (positively  at low levels,  negatively  at high levels),
and positively  related to the share  of government  spending  going  to investment.
ii.  uncertainty and fiscal policy
Uncertainty  about marginal  tax rates can also have  growth  effects. If the marginal  tax rate
on the taxed capital  good is uncertain  (because  of macroeconomic  instability,  for example),  risk
averse  investors  will  substitute  out of the capital  good  with the uncertain  private return and into
the other capital  good. This uncertainty  has an additional  negative  effect on the economy's
growth  rate from the distortion  induced  by the tax itself. In particular,  assuming  the tax rate on
the first capital  good is random  with an expected  value of r, this will  introduce  a positive  risk
premium,  P, into the equation  that determines  the allocation  of resources:
(18)  E[(1-r)F 1] = E[F 21 +  P(VAR(r);  r)
where E[ ] is the expected  value operator. P increases  when the variance  of the tax rate,
VAR(r),  rises. Thus an increase  in the variance  of the tax induces  a substitution  into capital  good
2, which  lowers  the marginal  product  of capital  and the economy's  growth  rate.'
The testable  prediction  emerging  from this analysis  is that increased  uncertainty  regarding
the private  returns to investment  across  capital  goods  alters the allocation  of resources  and lowers
the economy's  growth  rate for a given  investment  rate.3 This uncertainty  may  reflect high and
variable  fiscal  deficits,  an "overhang'  of external  debt, possibilities  of expropriation,  uncertainty
27Sa  th taCtboo by  lnao  (1987)  for  a formal  derivation.
28  here cam  some dirmsuan  when tax uncertaint will not alter  savinp decisons.  Iis  oocus  If tax revenues  arecmpletly
rebetd  with  certaintY,  ta  uncauftY  is uncurlated with  otber policies nd producAvity  shod.,  and agents  are  identicaL22
regarding tax enforcement, or uncertainty about the tax rate in specific sectors of the economy.'
For example, individuals  have to decide how much time and resources to invest in human capital
and how much to invest in physical  capital.  If there is more uncertainty regarding the private
returns to physical  capital, the uncertainty will cause too much human capital investment and
lower growth. Various empirical proxies for these risks will be used to measure the risk
associated with tax uncertainty including the variability  of the fiscal deficit, the external debt ratio,
the variance of average tax rates, variations in the sectoral composition of tax revenues, and
measures of political uncertainty that have been used to quantify the uncertain returns to easily
appropriated investments (Barro (1991)].
It is worth emphasizing the interactions between tax uncertainty and other policies. The
magnitude of the risk premium in equation (18) depends on the existence and level of policy
distortions besides tax uncertainty. Thus, the growth effects of increased tax uncertainty depend
on the marginal tax rate and other policies.'  Similarly,  in the case where tax revenues can be
spent on activities that increase the return to private investment, the magnitude of the risk
premium in equation (18) and the growth effects of increased tax uncertainty will depend on the
manner in which government resources are spent.  The potential importance of these interactions
and interrelationships among policies will be examined empirically  by including interaction terms
in the cross-country and pooled studies.
b.  Monetary  policy
With more than one type of capital good, inflation may have an efficiency impact, in
addition to the effect on growth through the level of investment described in the previous section.
This would be true if some investment goods required money to be used to purchase them, while
others did not.  For example, if there is a subsistence or household sector that does not use
currency for transactions, then inflation (r)  will act as a tax on capital in the modern sector but
not in the subsistence sector.  Growth will be lowered for a given rate of investment the same way
as described for a tax on one type of investment good in the previous section:
(19)  g = A0(X)  i -a  0'<6
Uncertainty about inflation can also slow growth by distorting investment decisions if
inflation affects sectors differentially. The inflation tax and uncertainty about inflation will  cause
investors to devote a smaller fraction of their investments to the sector (which we assume to be
Kj) affected by the inflation tax, which reduces economic growth.  Formally,
(20)  [(1-r)/(1  +#x)]E(F,)  = E(F 2) +  P(VAR(r);  xr, r)
'"For the roic of the cternal  debt overhang in creating uncertainty,  see Saclu (1988). On uncertainty  induced by unsble  polida,
it is interesting to reall  the higher  variance of growth ratc  in low inme  countrim (Section JA1).  T7his  mie  the interesting poambility
that policy  uncertainty could contribute  to a low.incotme  trap' of the kind dicusaed in Box 2.
"  For  cample, uncerainty  about taxm  has less  neptive impact  on growth  the higher is the expected  marginal  tax rate. This  is becaue
a high tax rate ilf  lowera  growth  so  much that the additonal  effect from uncertainty is smalL23
where  x  =  inflation,  VAR(x) = variance  of inflation,  P(  is the risk premium  associated  with
uncertain  inflation,  and E(  is the expected  value operator. Empirically,  the variance  of inflation
and of growth  rates of monetary  aggregates  can be used to measure  monetary  policy  uncertainty.
Again,  it is worth noting that interactions  between  inflation  uncertainty,  the inflation  rate,
and fiscal  policy  may  be empirically  important. The risk premium  depends  on policies  other than
inflation  uncertainty,  and the growth  effects  of inflation  uncertainty  will  depend on the level of
other policy  distortions. 3"  Indeed,  higher  inflation  alone could induce  greater uncertainty  about
future marginal  taxes  because  inflation  can interfere with the value of collected  taxes.
Examination  of these policy  interactions  will  be an important  component  of the empirical  inquiry.
c.  Financial  pocy
Policies  toward  domestic  financial  market activities  can also h wve  important  growth  effects
in this model. Financial  market  policies  affect  growth  by interfering  with the ability  of financial
markets  to manage  risk,  evaluate  and monitor  firms,  gather information,  and mobilize  resources.
As the discussion  above  has already  indicated,  differential  uncertainty  about the rate of
return to investment  can reduce  growth  by distorting  the allocation  of investment. Assume  that
sector one is composed  of firms  that receive  productivity  shocks.' 2 Individuals  can diversify  away
the risk  of productivity  shocks  by investing  in a financial  intermediary  (such as a bank) that owns
or lends  to many  firms. However,  if investors  cannot diversi4y  away  this risk by investing  in many
sector one firms  because  policies  interfere with the ability  of financial  markets  to allocate  risk,
then the return to investing  in sector one, F,, becomes  random. This will alter the allocation  of
investment:
(21)  E(F 1) = E(F 2) + P(VAR(FI)),
where  P is a risk premnium  that increases  when the variance  of returns to sector one firms  rises,
VAR(Fj). Uncertainty  plays  the same  role in preventing  the efficient  allocation  of capital (where
F, = F2) that a tax does.
The empirical  prediction  illustrated  in equation (21) is that financial  market policies  that
interfere  with the ability  of financial  markets  to help investors  diversify  risk can reduce growth  for
a given  rate of investment  by altering  allocation  decisions. 3 The types  of financial  policies  that
can inhibit  financial  market  activities  include  direct taxes  on financial  institutions,  high reserve
requirements,  interest rate controls,  direction  of credit toward  favored  sectors and other less
31For eample,  in the model above,  the risk pemium  becomes smaller if the inflation  ate is higher or marginal ux racr  ar  hier
for a given  vaiance  of inflation because higher inflatin  itself reducs  Investment  in the currency-using  sector.  Tbus, this predic  that
the higher  the infation rate or the higher  th  fscal tax rate, the smaller  is the negative  effect of ineasd  inflation uieanty  on giwib
32  Seaor two firms can ahto reee  shocs.  The imporgant  point is that one sector is riser  than another,  o that unceainty  an  alter
alloation  decisionL
33  Line  (1990, 1991)  demonates  this formal; for specific  finncal  instutions24
direct intrusions.  Some finanial  policies may also directly distort resources by favoring one type
of capital relative to another (for example, a credit subsidy for certain types of investments)  In
the individual  case studies, attempts will be made to gather direct measures of these policies.  In
the cross-country analyses, aggregate measures of the performance of the financial system will be
used. 34
Financial niarkets do more than manage risk.  They evaluate firrs,  monitor managers,
collect and process information about the national and global economy, and mobilize capitaL
These traits are captured by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989,
1990),  and Levine (1990, 1991). In the context of this proposal's model, these financial market
traits imply that restrictive financial market policies can reduce growth for a given investment rate
by worsening the allocation of resources.  Since financial market policies can both influence the
uncertainty faced by investors and the rate of return to private investment, the growth effects of
financial market policies will  depend on other policies and the growth affects of other national
policies will depend on financial market policies. 35 Again, these potentially important
interactions among policies would be an important and novel part of an empirical inquiry.
d.  Trade intervention  and exch4nge  rate policy
To consider the effects of trade policy,  we now interpret the two capital goods as
representing two different types of goods that are both traded intemationally (with price ratio
fixed at one for convenience). The second type of capital good K2 is made up of the domestically
produced good, used for domestic consumption, investment, and exports.  The first type of capital
good, K, is imported from abroad. An import tariff (or an equivalent quota) now operates as a
differential tax on the first type of capital good.  As in the case of a domestic tax differentially
applied, a higher import tariff T lowers growth for a given rate of investment; the relationship is
nonlinear:
(22)  g = A  (T) i-d  6  O
Also the tariff distortion will only lower growth if it applies to investment goods (and intermediate
goods); tariffs that distort only consumption decisions have a negative welfare impact but no
effect on long-run growth.  The testable prediction is that the average tariff rate on investment
goods and intermediate inputs should enter in a growth equation as an interaction term with
investment.
While this result was framed in terms of a single import good, it would also hold for
differential tariffs (or quotas) on different types of imported capital (or intermediate) goods.  For
example, we could interpret the two types of capital goods as both imported, while the domestic
oLtput is only used for consumption and exports.  Then a higher tariff on one of the imported
3 4There  arc problems  with exsting empirical  prcfies of financial  market policie  The prome will  be disced  below,  but they  include
identificaton  of seveely nepthe  real inteut  rates.  ratios  of vety broad money menurs  to GDP, and the fraction of all financial  A
held by the central bank.
35  In this model,  for cample  fiscal  and inflation taxes  have larger  growth  effects in an economy  with  well-functioning  fincial  marvet,
than in an econmy with highly  resrctive financal  market  policies  The growth  effects of policy interactions ia  demonrated  forMal
in Luine (1991).25
goods will introduce a differential between their before-tax marginal products, lowering growth for
a given amount of investment.  This suggests that measures of dispersion of tariffs should also
enter the growth equation in interaction with the investment rate.
We should also note that uncertainty as to tariff rates will have the same denressing effect
on growth (for given investment) as tax uncertainty, suggesting that a measure of variance of tariff
rates (or import quotas) over time should be added to the equation.  This implies that temRorary
import liberalization will not help growth.'
Fmally,  the effect of exchange rate controls could be examined in this framework.
Rationing of foreign exchange at the official  exchange rate often leads to the emergence of a
black market, where foreign currency is sold at a large premium over the official rate.  If
allocation of foreign exchange at the official  rate is made for some types of imported inputs but
not for others, then the black market exchange rate premium acts like a differential tax on those
inputs for which no foreign exchange is allocated. 37 Again, the relationship between the black
market premium p and growth will be nonlinear, albeit always negative:
(23)  g  =A+(p)i-6  a'<0
e.  Policies  on foreign direct investment
The discussion  of foreign direct investment often refers to the special benefits thought to
be embodied in foreign capital--technological  and commercial know-how and other human capital
attributes of foreign specialists, the advanced technology embodied in physical capital investments
made by foreign firms, etc)'  With this in mind, a natural way to treat foreign direct investment
is as a separate factor of production that complements domestic capital.
In terms of the model that we are using in this section, we can think of capital type 1 as
the stock of cumulative foreign direct investment, while capital type 2 is the capital stock owned
and operated by nationals.  Since capital type 1 contains unique features associated with foreign
investment, nationals do not have the option of investing in it; conversely, foreigners cannot invest
in type 2 capital.  We also continue to maintain the assumption that nationals do not have access
to international capital markets. We will study only the case of endogenous investment and
saving by nationals.
Since foreign nationals have the option of investing their money at the international
interest rate, the equilibrium condition for the stock of foreign investment will be that its marginal
36A  htceture  on unenainty  and investment supports this conclusion (e.g. van Wijnbergen (1985) and Rodrik (1989)).
37his  assume that the authorities can enforce that the inputs  imported at the official  rate are used in production and not simply  resold
on the black market.  If inputs ar  freely traded on the black market, then the allocation of foreign echange  at the offidal rate simply
generts  pure rents, with no effciency impications. However,  generaly resourc  are used to evade the controls of the authoritie,  or
usd  to lobby to recdve the rmts, in which case the eficency  effecs described continue to hold  A large hterature on rent4ed  ad
smuggling  makes these points (e.g. Krueger (1974)).
38See  Hediner  (1989) and lnotai (1990) for a survey. See also the dicusion  in Appendix 1.26
product be equal to the international interest rate.'  We consider policies that levy a differential
income tax on the income from foreign capital, which implies that it is the after-tax marginal
product that is equated to the international interest rate:
(24)  (1-r) A F1 = r
The marginal product of type 1 capital (foreign investment) will be higher the lower is the ratio of
foreign to domestic capital.  A higher tax on foreign investment will require a higher marginal
product from foreign capital, and thus will imply a lower ratio of foreign to domestic capital in the
long-run.
With endogenous investment, the growth rate of the economy will be given by:
(25)  g = (A F2 (r) -a  -p)/A  F2,< 0
Citizens in the economy will accumulate type 2 capital at a rate that depends on the
marginal product of that capital.  More foreign investment (because of lower taxes, for example)
implies a higher marginal product of domestic capital, so it will imply a higher growth rate.  (The
ratio of foreign to domestic capital will be fixed in the long run by (24) and thus the two types of
capital will grow at the same rate.)  The theory thus makes a strong prediction: taxation of foreign
capital will decrease foreign investment and lower growth.' 0
f.  Sectoral  policies
The model of distortions can be applied naturally to the consideration of sectoral policies.
Equation (7) can be used to think of policies that affect the relative prices of different types of
investment goods, such as physical  versus human capital, or equipment versus structures.
Disaggregated data from Summers and Heston (1988) can be used to examine the relative prices
of different types of physical  investment goods as measures of price distortions.  In testing the
predictions of the model, one could exploit also the disaggregated data on quantities of
investment by type available from this data set.
Equation (7) is also a useful short-cut to think of the sectoral composition of inputs :o
aggregate production. 4"  For example, type 1 capital could be interpreted as being made up of
manufacturing goods and type 2 capital as being made up of agricultural goods (although we
390foue  this determination of foreign  direct investment is ovenimplified for the purposs  of clarit.  Iizondo  (1990) contains a
survey  of the theory.
flris  argument  could  be taken  to an artme, implying  that subsidizins  forign capital  would  actually  raise  growth. ere  are  two
caves that should be mae  to this condusin.  First, subidis  of foreign  capital  must be financed-such as by a tax on domeic  capitaL
With Cobb-Dougla production, for  -ampe, growth  would dedine with an  icreae  in the subsidy rate fianced  by an increae  in the tax
rate  on domestic  capital Secood an inrese  in the growth  rate achieved  by  a  ubsidyon forign  intment  actually  worawe  nce
it induces invesment whose  return d  not coer the oppottunity cost to the economy of the capital whc  is given  by the inteanstonl
intest  rate,  r.  Ther is a long trdition  in the literatur  cognizing  this kind  of Immisertzing growth",  eg. Bhagwati  and  Brecher (1980),
and Brcher  and  Dza-Aleandro (1977). The same  cooclusion  holds true for any other disortion  (such as  tariffs) that acts  as a subsidy
to forign  Investment.
4tAlthough  we speak of all inputs as  "capital, this frumwork can alo be used to analyze  distortions of pric  of intermediate inputs.
Such dituorin  have  analogus effects on growth  to those of ditortins  of capital  goocd  pnces.27
continue to think of output as one composite good). The wedge between marginal products of the
two types can be interpreted as a differential tax that distorts the relative price of the two sectors.
The tax may be implicit rather than explicit, as could arise from quantity rationing, price controls,
differences in effective protection rates, etc. Relative price data from Summers and Heston (1988)
could be used also to assess sectoral relative price distortions." 2 World Bank data on the sectoral
composition of output like that used by Syrquin and Chenery (1989) can be used to examine
whether the structure of output (relative to a "normal' structure) is related to such sectoral
distortions.'  Other direct measures of sectoral distortions could also be used, such as the
measures of differential taxation of agriculture developed by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988).
The disaggregated data will be used in the examination of each of the policy areas listed
above. The relative price and quantity data will be related to broad measures of the various
policies to assess the sectoral implications  of policies. For example, one would test whether the
existence of financial repression is associated with relatively expensive capital goods, relatively
cheap industrial goods, etc. The resulting effects on growth can then be examined in cross-country
regressions.
g.  Interactions  among resource  allocation  policies
For simplicity,  we have so far presented interaction effects as involving at most two
policies together.  Of course, in real world applications, there are many policies that affect many
types of capital goods in different ways. In particular, some policies may have offsetting effects on
growth.  For example, one policy may penalize one type of capital while another policy subsidizes
it, with zero net effect.  While such an exact offset is unlikely, the total effect of a set of
distortionary policies on growth will be generallY  less than the sum of the individual policy effects.
In the empirical implementation, it is important to include interaction terms among the policies to
capture these offsets.
B.  Synthetic issues
Some issues cut across policy areas:
1.  Growth and welfare
A major preoccupation of the development literature is the extent to which per capita
income growth translates into welfare improvements for the poor and for the population as a
whole.  There are three elements that will be considered:  (1) how the additional income arising
from growth is distributed, (2) how much income is correlated with social indicators, and (3) how
42An  anaogous execise is that of Dollar (1990). who looked at the price of the same consumption basket relative to a benchmark
country from Summes and  Heson (1988)  as a measre of trade  poicq distortion (including  a corection for vatiation of nontradable pic
acrms countrie).  Dc Long and Summes (1990) is also relevant  here
,OA  ve-kown  regularity  discused by Chenery and Syrquin  (1989) is the tendency of the share  of industry to rise and agriculture  to
fall as per capita income rs.  The approach  of the "patterns"  literature associated  with these authors is to associate  deviations  from  this
path with policy  repmes and other factos  We would folow this approach to eamine  specifically  the effect of sectoral distoniof.  We
may ao  eramine  the  predictions  of differnt  models  for the trend in the agricultural  shamr For  -ampe,  Rebelo (1991) presents a model
in whi  some ectors use Ibred  factors  (like agriculture  using land), wbile other sectots use only reproducible inputs  Sustained grth
is still poible.  and the hare of the fixod  factor  sectors  will fall under some pammeter  configurations.28
income growth relates to the environment.4 While recognizing the large literature on these
issues, the project will examine fresh evidence for the relationship between welfare and growth.
This is important both to assess whether raising income growth is a sensible policy objective, and
to identify any feedback effects on growth from the social consequences of the growth process
a.  Inequality  and growth
Table 3 shows a comparison of per capita incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the
population and the average per capita income for those countries that have data on income
distribution. The table shows a high degree of correlation (.77) between the per capita income
and the income of the poorest part of the population -- differences in inequality do not dominate
differences in per capita income across countries.  If we think of per capita income as the sum of
past growth, this suggest that growth dominates redistribution as a factor in the income of the
poor.
But the outliers give pause to the notion that cross-sectional growth differences are all
that matters -- the income of the poorest fifth in Brazil is only sixty percent of that in Morocco,
despite Brazilian per capita income being two and a half times larger.  Similarly,  the poorest in
Botswana are slightly  worse off than in India, even though Botswana's per capita income is three
times larger.  However, even in these outliers, the relationship between growth and inequality is
unclear  -- would Botswana's poor be better off if the country had not grown?
A large literature has found similar patterns to that displayed in table  1, both
intertemporally and cross-sectionally. Fields' (1989) survey of the literature indicates strong
evidence of reduction in absolute poverty being associated with growth, with poverty "more apt to
decrease the more rapid is economic growth".4 The notion that absolute poverty tends to
increase with economic growth has been decisively  refuted.  The 1990 WDR found that income of
the poorest tenth grew more rapidly than per capita income in 9 out of 11 developing country
growth episodes.  But outliers still exist -- in Costa Rica, the poor suffered an absolute decline in
income despite average per capita growth of 3.5 percent over 1971-86.'
The famous Kuznets hypothesis that inequality first rises and then falls with income has
also been examined in the literature.  Cross-section studies have tended to confirm it, while
intertemporal studies --which seem more appropriate -- have found little evidence for it (Fields
(1989), WDR 1990).
Other studies have looked at how inequality itself may lower growth because it tends to
lead to policies that harm growth.  Alesina and Rodrik (1991) found that higher inequality tends
to lower growth in the subsample of democracies but is insignificant in nondemocratic countries.
Almost identical results were found by Persson and Tabellini (1991), alt-ough the significance of
4"We  do not consider anotheW imu  In  this sction  that was  biefly mentioned elewhere in this propwa  growth  could be immilulzing
becuse policy  distortions  may eist  that  cause too much ivsmcet.
'5FeI  (1989), p. 174.
"6WDR 1990,  p. 4P.29
Table 3
Inequality  and growth
Percent share  of  Per capita income  Per capita
income  of  1988  income
lowest  20 percent  lowest  20
(various  years,  1980's)  percent
Bangladesh  9.3  170  79
India  8.1  340  138
Pakistan  7.8  350  137
Ghana  6.5  400  130
Sri Lanka  4.8  420  101
Indonesia  8.8  440  194
Philippines  5.5  630  173
Cote d'Ivoire  5.0  770  193
Morocco  9.8  830  407
Guatemala  5.5  900  248
Botswana  2.5  1010  126
Jamaica  5.4  1070  289
Colombia  4.0  1180  236
Peru  4.4  1300  286
Costa  Rica  3.3  1690  279
Poland  9.7  1860  902
Malaysia  4.6  1940  446
Brazil  2.4  2160  259
Hungary  10.9  2460  1341
Yugoslavia  6.1  2520  769
Venezuela  4.7  3250  764
Correlation  Coefficien.,  per capita income  and income  of lowest  quintile: 0.77
Source: World  Development  Report .990
inequality  was  rather marginal.  Lindert and Williamson  (1984)  present evidence  against  the
Kaldor  hypothesis  that, because  it is the rich that save,  inequality  is necessary  for higb saving  and
ghwtL
The project would  consider  inequality  in two  ways. Frst, measures  of inequality  (e.g. the
ratio of the ircome share of the top to the bottom  quintile)  will themselves  be tried as dependent
variables  as part of each policy  task, to examine  whether the same policies  that affect growth  also
affect  inequality. Second,  inequality  measures  will  be used as independent variables  in growth
equations  to test whether higher inequality  can make a given policy  more or less  damaging  to
growth. The synthesis  task wil explore  further  the empirical  regularities  between income  grow
and inequality  to address  the effectiveness  of per capita  growth  as an instrument  to reduce
poverty.30
b.  Growth and other welfare  indicators
Per capita income shows a high degree of correlation with social indicators such as life
expectancy,  daily calorie supply, low birth weight, secondary enroUment, infant mortality, maternal
mortality, and access to safe drinking water and sanitation services (table 4). The correlation is
less strong between income and the crude death rate, population per physician, primary
enroUment,  and literacy ratios. There is also a correlation between percent changes in calorie
supply, population per physician,  and infant mortality and income growth, while percent changes
in primary and secondary enrollment, literacy, life expectancy, and the crude death rate are
essentially uncorrelated with growth.' 7
Simple correlations may understate the relation between social indicators and income
because the relationship may be nonlinear, as suggested by Ingram (1989).  He confirmed a
statistical relationship that implies that life expectancy, primary enrollment, and daily calorie
intake improve rapidly as income rises from low levels, then level off as income rises beyond a
certain middle income threshhold.  This is plausible since these indicators are inherently bounded.
This helps to explain Ingram's finding of strong unconditional convergence across countries in
social indicators, even though he finds no evidence of unconditional convergence in incomes.
However, there are siz.zable  outliers to the income-social indicator relationship.  The
WDR 1990 noted a striking phenomenon  -- a major improvement in life expectancy and primary
enroUlment  in Africa over 1965-85  despite negative growth in per capita consumption. 4
Conversely,  Pakistan registered little improvement in net enrollment over 1965-85 (it was still only
43 percent in 1985) despite per capita growth of 2.5 percent over the period.'
The relationship between growth and improvements in social indicators supports the study
of growth as a generally useful proxy for broader notions of welfare improvement.  However, the
existence of large outliers suggests an examination of factors that can cause social improvement
and growth to diverge.  Social indicators to some extent reflect conscious choices made by the
government and by private individuals. For example, the allocation of public expenditure has a
major impact on many indicators.  In each of the policy  studies, we will develop one or more
social indicators to be tested as dependent variables along with per capita growth as functions of
policies. Some of the social indicators may also be proxies for the level or rate of accumulation of
human capital, which suggests their inclusion on the right hand side of those equations that also
include physical  capital investment.
4 7Work for the 1991 WDR by Suiit  Bhalla found reasonable correlations between changes in per capita income and chae  in
educational  attainment, infant mortality,  and political liberty,  although the  ast  correlation is rather weak However, he cites otber studies
that claim a high corrlation  between per capita income and political and civil liberty (Dasgupta and Weale (1990), Scully  (1988)).
Looking  at infant morality,  the 1991  WDR found  evidence  that both income growth  and government  health apenditure  explain  its decIe
in developing  countries (King and Rowazweig  (1991), Bhalba  and Gilt (1991)). Correlations between changes in indicators can be seen
as a stronger test of association  given the posibility of spurious  correlations between variables with trendas
4OWDR  1990,  p. 40 Another ocial  indicator, per capita daily  calorie supply,  did fall in 16 African counties over 1965-86.  (WDR 1990,
table 28).
*ibild.,  p. 43.31
Table 4
Income and Social Indicators
1985 Corrlation  Correlation bet.196-85
betweeen per capita  per capita growth and
income and level of:  percent change 1965-85  in
Life expectancy  .67  .02
Crude death rate  -.31  .01
Daily calorie supply per capita  .70  .33
Babies with low birth weight (%)  -.52
Primary enrollment  .28  -.15
Secondary  enrollment  .76  -.09
Population per physician  -.35  .33
Infant mortality rate  -.64  -.40
Maternal mortality rate  -.43
Percent of population with access
to safe drinling water  .66
to sanitation services  .60
Female  literacy ratio  .14
Male literacy ratio  .18
Deforestation  -.11
c.  Growth  and the enviromnent
Another important welfare indicator is the state of the enironment.  The poor quality and
great scarcity of data has inhibited quantitative work relating growth to environmental
degradation. Table 4 shows that one of the few quantitative measures available, the percent rate
of deforestation, shows little correlation with aggregate growth (and in fact is the "wrong"  sign
compared to the popular perception that growth causes deforestation). However, this is just as
likely to reflect the unreliability  of the data as any lack of relationship between growth and
deforestation.32
Some recent research on industrial countries has suggested that, with proper policies,
reasonable economic growth can be compatible with preserving the environment.'  For example,
the rapid fall in energy use in the OECD countries (23 percent fail in energy requirements per
unit of GDP over 1970-87)  suggests that other inputs can be elastically  substituted for exhaustible
resources if price incentives are sufficiently  strong (Pearce (1990)). However, this process should
not be seen as costless -- some have argued that environmental regulations lowered productivity
growth in the U.S. in the 70's and 80's (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1989)).
In the developing wor.d, deforestation, soil erosion, and pollution have imposed significant
economic costs, both measured and unmeasured. It is conceptually unclear whether higher
economic growth worsens or improves the environment.  The tradeoff in welfare between
conventional income and environmental quality is also unclear (and may differ across countries or
across income levels).  While higher growth implies higher growth in demand for exhaustible
resources, it also may imply a shift away from use of exhaustible resources. For example,
deforestation in the Sahel and the Philippines is associated with consumption of fuelwood by the
poorest segment of the population  -- increased income could lead to substitution of less
environmentally costly forms of energy for fuelwood.  Rising income could also lead to greater
demand for environmental preservation.5'
2.  Persistence of growth rates
A surprising fact is the low persistence of countries' growth performance across periods, as
mentioned in the first section.  Table 5 shows the cross-section correlation between growth in
subsequent decades to be around .3.  This captures the persistence of relative performance, since
the correlation is with respect to deviations from the average for ail countries.  In other words,
this correlation measures the degree to which being an above-average performer one period is a
good predictor of being an above-average performer the following period. Since this correlation is
with respect to the period average, it removes any common global trends in growth rates.  Several
hypotheses could explain the low persistence of relative performance.
Policies. While policy regimes are commonly thought to be highly persistent, this is not
true for all policies, as shown in table 5. The government current expenditure variables --
consumption and education spending -- are the most persistent, far more so than growth.
50See  the  useful  srvey of Pearce (1990)  and the  heuristic  treatment  of Anderson  (1990).
SlWe  have  worked wut  an  eaample  in which  natural ources (assumed  to be in fued supply)  not used  in production  enter  the  utility
function. Sustained  growth equires that the  elasticity  of substitution  in production  between  reproducible  inputs  (capital) and nauanl
raourcns  be  greater  than  one. With a Cobb-Dougi utility function,  the use  of natural  reources  in production  gos asymptotikly to
zero  in the  optimal  plan,  ie. all natural  resou  are  preseved  for their utility  value. Whether  the market  can  repliote the  opal  plan
depends  on appropriate  pricing  of natural  resources33
Table 5
Persistence of policies and growth performance
Cross-section Correlation  Cross-Section Correlation
between 1960s  and 1970s  between 1970s and 1980s
Per capita Growth  .26  .32
Black market premium  .62  .45
Inflation  .40  .41
Labor force growth  .70  .79
Government Consumption/GDP  .76  .64
Government Education Spending/GDP  .75  .74
Government Investment Spending/GDP  .49
Real interest rates  .48  .32
Trade orientation  .56
Comparing 1973-85  with 1963-73,  based on 1987 WDR List of four categories:
1. strongly outward oriented
2.  moderately outward oriented
3.  moderately inward oriented
4.  strongly inward oriented
However, government investment, trade orientation, inflation, the black marL  et premium, and real
interest rates are not very persistent (although still more persistent than growihi. 52 We will
examine the ability  of policies to explain the low growth persistence by examining the standard
errors of pooled time-series cross-section tegressions that use decennial averages for growth rates
and policy  variables.
Random error.  A stochastic growth modeL such as that of Rebelo (1991a), implies that
growth will be given by a component dependent on policies and a stochastic term reflecting
random shocks (such as those to the rate of return to capital). The policy component itself is less
52Most  of theme  "poUi" meures  contain  endosflous elementL However,  it sems plausible  that ca-country  variation  in, for
emmpke,  in&"ti  blak madret  pumi.  and re  interat rates  a mainly  due to poliy chois  on money  creation,  exchange  rate  oatrals,
and interet rae cotwIa, rCuecdvY.34
than perfectly  persistent,  as noted above.  A plausible  variance  level in the stochastic  term could
explain  a significant  portion  of the low  persistence  of growth  rates. We performed  some Monte
Carlo  simulations  that indicate  that the observed  low  persistence  of growth  rates, combined  with
persistence  of about .6 of policies,  could  be reproduced  with a standard  deviation  of 1.7
percentage  points  on growth  rates.  The project  will  explore  further the amount of random
variation  underlying  growth  rates. The random  error could  be interpreted as cyclical  movements,
random  technological  or natural shocks  (such  as a drought),  or external shocks. 53
External  shock.  External  shocks  represent  one particular  type  of random  error that could
cause  low  persistence  in growth  rates. However,  studies  such as Mitra et al. (1990)  and Balassa
and McCarthy  (1984)  have found little evidence  for strong  effects  of external shocks  on growth
rates.54
Transitional  dynamics.  Some models  in this proposal  would  imply  transitional  dynamics
that could  cause  growth  to be unstable  over time even with unchanged  policies. For example,
initially  rapid  and then decelerating  growth  could arise  from transitional  dynamics  in an initial
situation  where  there are imbalances  between  the quantities  and rates of return of different  types
of capital. Transitional  dynamics  could  be incorporated  in the analysis  by, among  other things,
including  income  level  or initial  capital  stocks  as an independent  variable.
C.  Empirical  Methodology
Empirical  analysis  should  use formal  econometric  techniques  in evaluating  the predictions
of the analytical  framework. This section  (1) repeats the main hypotheses,  (2) discusses  measures
of national  policies  and, (3) outlines the cross-country  procedures.
Since  the empirical  predictions  have  already  been discussed  in the Analytical  Framework
section  above,  Table  6 simply  collects  the major hypotheses  that could  be tested.
The major  themes that emerge from  the analytical  framework  are (1) national policies  or
uncertainty  about national  policies  affect  long-run  growth  (and do not just have  one-time level
effects)  by altering  the level of investment;  (2) policies  also affect  growth  by distorting  the
allocation  of resources;  and (3) there are important  linkages  among  policies. For example,  for a
given  level  of investment,  distortionary  taxes  like inflation  tend to slow  growth  but productive
government  expenditures  can contribute  to faster growth. Thus, the growth  effe  cts of more
inflation  may  depend on how the resources  from the inflation  tax are spent.  In addition,  the
model  indicates  that policies  that affect  the allocation  of resources  generally  have non-linear
effects  on growth.
Some  indicators  of national  policies  are provided  in Table 7; Table 8 lists international
53tn  the Monte  Cuazb  Lnulti  we  assumed  tht  the  rndom  enw  wa aeriy  unorrlated  Seal conaatb  of an et-Or  in the
leel of  output  (like  a cydical  eor  term)  couwld  induce  neptie  autocowelatlon  of growth  rates,  which  would  make  obeving a bw crao
piod  corelation  ielky.  he  simubati is also  constained  to rprduce the obherved  crousctioaal variance. he hedp  of LAt
Prltdcett  on this  simulation  i  grtefuly  acknwledged.
5See the Summary  of thb kew in Bhalla  (1991  WDR.  chapter  2).35
data sources.  We recognize that there are conceptual and statistical problems with these
measures.  Research is needed to design and construct more accurate measures of fiscal,
monetary, trade and financial policies.  Also, since the listed indicators are commonly used, it is
useful to determine whether these variables reliably predict growth.  If these policy indicators are
useful in explaining growth, then they may be useful target indicators in formalizing policy reform
packages.
Empirical implementation should update earlier datasets.  For example, the compilation of
census data on educational attainment by Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) could be updated
with 1990 census observations in some countries.
From the WDR 1991  database, one could use the following  variables:
1.  Estimates of factor inputs (capital stock, labor force, arable land, and mean education
of the worling population for 68 countries).  Some of the specifications that will  be
tested include factor accumulation on the right hand side so as to test for the effect of
policies on efficiency. The factor input data will be useful in this regard.
2.  Welfare indicators (infant mortality, female/male ratios, mean index of civil and
political liberties). These and other indicators will be useful to examine the correlation
between growth and more general welfare improvement.
3.  Data on project economic rates of return used in a recent paper by Kaufnann  (1991).
4.  Government expenditures for health and education (original source is IMF and
UNESCO); private spending on health (available for 19 countries, original source is
United Nations).  The government spending data will be important for the analysis  of
fiscal policies; the private health spending will be useful in measuring factor inputs.
5.  Trade policy indicators (average tariff rates, nontariff barriers (UNCIAD),  index of
trade  iiberatlization  - 1960-84  (Papageorgiou, Choksi, Michaely), index of trade
liberalization - 1978-88  (Halevi, Thomas), price distortion index (modified version of
Dollar (1991).
6.  Direct foreign investment flows (55 countries, 1970-89).
7.  Political indicators (irregular e%ecutive  transfers).
8.  Measures of inequality (35 countries).36
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Tible 7:: Dta  for analysis  of policy  and  growth
MEASURES  OPt  OMT1TT  EMPLOYMENT,  AND POPULATION GROWrH  :
Gioss output growth  (GNP and GDP)
Rodbustess  checks:
4ltrmative  bas- years:
excluding  extraction  of exhaustible  resources
Population  growth:
Labor force grwth 
Employment  growth  (man-hours  where  available,:which:will  be seldom)
MEASURES  OF PRIVATE  FACTOR  ACCUMULATION
Private  investment  in physical  capital
Private  education  spending
Measures  of enrollment  (primary,  secondary,  higher-level)
Measures  of human  capital  stock  from previous  studies:
Measures  of healtb (such as infant mortality  and.life.  expectancy)
MEASURES  OF:POUCY
Fiscal  de¢.ts:..
consolidated  nonfinancial  public  sector deficits  .
.structurl deficit:
variance  of overalln  ad  structural  .deficit...
Public  revenue policy  (levels  and variances):
Cbnsumption  taxes-bases  and rates:.:
Domestic  sales taxes.on  production,inputsaninvestment goc s
ncomeeaxes  .. pua::m:::
-corporate  . . -household
Import taxes  -.- :::.:
..  ,,,  . . - . ..  . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..........
Reen.ue offcommodit marketig boards::::..
Public  spending:.:::
Physical  capital  formation...
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Table  7 (continuation)  . .
a th.  :  ..  ............. :
-basic health.
.- other.  . ......
Goods-subsidies
. . ~  ~ ~~~~~~~~~.  ..  :.'.:.'..:.
Monehry  polisv  ~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .. . .............
Mean rate  f.mony  grwt,  inflation  ..  ..:.
Variance.of  monetary  growth,.inflation:
Trade intervention




Average  tariff rate and measures  of dispersion
-consumption:.
-inteimediate inputs,  ... .....
.-investment::..
Ratio domestic:producer:price/world  price  for maJor  commodities;...
Black  market eiohange  rate.premium  -(mean  and-variance  - . .:. :.::
Trade policy  indicators  (see sou.rces  below)..  . .....
Financial  sector policies-
Differential  domestic  deposit.  rate and international.interes2  rate.:
Real domesticdedposit  interest rate.
Spread.betwee deposit.  and  .lending  rate..-.  ....  .. ..........
Ex-post  reserve equirement:  (bank  reserves/deposits).
Interest-rate  on go  nment  bonds
Subsidized  credits  (amounts:and  interest  rates)
Share of totallfinancial  assets  held by central  bank
Openness  to -forein caoital
Direct foreign  investment  flow-s
Other net capitalflo.vs.-
Restrictions  on diect foreign  investment,  forein bdrrowing.:and  capit  e.p.ort  .(and  ...
variance  of restrictions  over time).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  . .... : ..  '.:.  :  . '::-  .:  ,  ...........  . .39
TABLE&AA  pi  1d::t:  c  1auesm .
GM"  ouPA  Nrawth GDP)  ".,  FIncF.),:IFWodm
,,  ~~~~~~~da8ita,Smmr  n:d:testorn(1988'  "'
Population roh  IFS,  Wod  Bknk  da,  Su  o  (1988
Labor  foroe  grWWt-  World  Bank ata 
Employme  ,growth  hours:  ILO..
Prvate  tIeatmentrtk  physica  capital  P  a  &  Mladaras (W1969)  :Honot
prime so"  (1";  - :9
Hbb~Wb,and Cru  (tcar:  ':'::g  ::
,s,*",#w..  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ...-.  :..:. PrIat fnacia savin  1K0nolhan&Atys(99
Private  educio  spenn  Lau Jamis  &  'Low  1199(:':
Measurs  d .LoIms  UNESCO. Wr wand  WON  9W,  World  D::::u.
Report <DR  1691
Measures  of human  capital  stock  Jamson  &LAU  (19w,h:BeWll  (1990),  Psacaaoos
& Arrlagada  (1986),  iLau,  Jamson
and Lou  x.(1990).
Measures  of health  (such  as  life  expectancy)  World  Bank  dat,  WHO,  FAO,  UN  Statistial  Office-
Fsc  deficits  ERS  (1969,  Easterly  (1969)
Public  revwnue  Govenmt  FinancialStatistcs  (GFS),IMF,  ERS,  WDR:::
(1988)
Taxes  - conunpon.  corporate,  e  xt,  t  GFS
ImpoK  and  incorme
Pubtlc  expenditure  GFS,  ERS,  WOR  -(19698)
Education  (FS, UNESCO,  Sumnmes  and  :Heston  (1988)
Helth  OFS  -
Goods  subsdies.  GFS
Defense.  GFS,  Bwro:and:Wol  (1989) 
Investmet  GFS,  Barnroand  Wo#  (1989),  ERS,  WDR(1198:
Mean,  varnc  d mnonty  grwth, Infation  IFS
Trade  Irntrvnon  meansues  .
Pret:of  impot.subject  to.lkiens.ng:  .apagoglou,  M.Cokl  (990) study  on
Average  tarf rate  and  mures  of aersi  .. trade  libal  on
Measures  of  trade  opennessa/nterventlon  Dollar:(1990),  Bhaila  (1990),  Leamer.(1988).  Levin 
asanR.flt(19W0),.Balasa.(198,.:
HOlWAv199,  :WDR:(187':
Foreign  drct  Iwestment  flows  anc  stocks  IFS: MF-  Research:0fpatment
Ratio  of domestic  producer  pric,:to  world  prie:  FAO,  ERS  (1969)
Black  market  ehange:rate promIum  Levina.and  Renelt:(1990a)..
Financial  Wctor  policies:
Dli  ferantia  domestc  deposit  raeand Intl  ,atos  ll:S,  GeIb  (1969):
Real  don_efc  deposit  Interes  rat  :Gelb:.(1969,  Easterl  (1969).  :::
Spead b*tween-deposit  and  lending  rate.  IFS.
Ai  of  M3  to  GD-  IFS::.
Ex-poet  r  ve requmen  IF
Inrt  rwte  ont got  bonds  - IFS,:  Eastel19y.  :
Rat  of  flnancil ast  held  by Coeral  Bank  IFS,  WDR  (1969)
NoW.  We  will rely also  on  aSnk  reports  -anxi  fation dsources.  This prelimin  sting  ::O  Only
itrnadorn  data  sources.:
Abbvai:  ERS:1  Estel,  Rodriguez  and  SMlHebOel  (199) rech  ojct  1n  progrees40
Cross-country  regression  techniques  and pooled  cross-country,  time-series  procedures
could be used to examine  the predictions  from the analytical  framework  summarized  in Table  3.
The studies  should  include  the broadest  possible  coUlection  of countries  (usually  between 60-100
countries  depending  on the sample  period and the data). Cross-country  analyses  could use data
aveiaged  over long periods  (between  25-35  years). The pooled  regressions  could  use data
averaged  over fewer  years  in order to include  multiple  observations  from each country. The data
are averaged  to abstract  from  cyclical  fluctuations  and thus focus  on longer-run  components  of
the data.
The research  could  be organized  so that each study  focuses  on a key component  of
national policies. This  organization  has two  important  objectives Frst, a researcher  focussing  on
trade policy,  for example,  can specialize  in designing  improved  measures  of trade policy  and also
on modifying  the analytical  framework  to draw sharper predictions  on the effects  of trade polcy
on growth,  whether  these effects  work through  the level  of investment  or the allocation  of
resources  or both, and potential  interactions  with other policies. Thus, specialization  wiU
hopefully  serve  to improve  our understanding  of the growth  effects  of each national policy  and
highlight  the most important  interactions  among  policies. The second  objective  of organizing  the
studies  around particular  policies  is to keep the individual  research tasks feasible. After working
on the relationship  between  one national  policy  and growth,  a researcher  may  develop many
indicators  and many  predictions  regarding  potential  interactions  with other policies. To examine
these predictions  and gauge  the growth  effects  of a single  policy,  it wil be very difficult  to
consider  all of the policy  indicators  constructed  for the other national  policies. Continual
interactions  among  the individual  researchers  will allow  the "trade" researcher  to use the one or
two best "financia policy'  indicators  in.  his evaluation  of the effects  of trade policy.
An essential  aspect  of any  empirical  investigation  should  be carefully  testing  the
robustness  of the findings. Levine  and Renelt (1990a)  show  that many  conclusions  from past
cross-country  growth  regressions  are sensitive  to slight  alterations  in the list of policy  indicators
included  as explanatory  variables. This is part of the motivation  for simultaneously  examining  the
growth  effects  of a broad collection  of national  policies. Other types  of diagnostic  testing should
also be encouraged  [e.g.,  Leamer  (1983,  1985)]. If certain  policy  indicators  are found to be highly
correlated  with  each other so that some do not have  an independently  strong  correlation  with
growth,  this might  allow  us to investigate  the linkages  between  policy  and growth  in terms of
"policy  packages"  (however,  Table 9 shows  that policy  correlations  are not as great as usually
assumed.)
Grier and Tullock  (1989)  show  that important  additional  information  can be extracted
from the data by using  pooled  cross-section,  time-series  analyses  instead  of simple  cross-country
regressions.  Using  data averaged  over five  years  or over ten years  yields  more data points,  which
allow  the identification  of different  effects  of policy  between  continents. The scope of pooled
analyses  could  be expanded  by (1) studying  the 1960-1990  and 1970-1990  periods  when more
detailed  data are available  compared  to the 1951-1980  period studied  by Grier and Tullock
(1989),  (2) using  an analytical  framework  to interpret the results, (3) considering  a broad array of
national  policies  and their potential  interactions,  and (4) conducting  detailed  sensitivity  analysas41
Table 9
MATRIX OF CORRELIATIONS  ACROSS POLICIESA
Government  Government  Fmancial  Public  Trade
Consumption  Expenditure  Inflation  Repression  Investment  Dummy
Share of GDP  on Education  Dummy  Share  of GDP
60's  70's  80's  60's  70's  80's  60's  70's  80's  60's  70's  80's  70's  80's  60-80's
Black  Market
Exchange  Rate  -0.06  -0.04  -0.09  0.21  0.29  -0.10 -0.10  0.57  0.31  0.24  0.37  0.63  0.22  -0.10
Premium  -0.18  0.06  0.36  0.46  0.23  0.54
Govemment
Consumption  0.13  0.54  0.59  -0.08 -0.00 -0.04  0.32  -0.08  -0.10  0.45  0.29
Share of GDP  0.55  -0.06  -0.16  0.42  -0.14
Govemment
Expenditure  -0.08  0.09  0.01  -0.06  0.16  0.09  0.33  -0.15
on Education  -.07  -0.02  0.38 -0.34
Inflation  0.22  0.47  0.41  -0.01  -0.16
0.46  -a12  0.05
Financial
Repression  0.05  -0.30
Dummy  0.00  0.47
Pub Investment
Share  of GDP  -0.18
Note:  Correlations  shown  are for corresponding  time periods  (i.e.,  60's  vs 60's  etc..)
Correlations  in italics  are for whole  time periods  (i.e.,  60's-Ws  vs 60's-80's,  70's-80's  vs 70's-80's).
Correlations  in italics  for per capita income  are 70's  vs 70's-Ws for Investment  and 60's  vs 60's-8s  for the rest.
Financial  Repression  Dummy  = 1 if average  real deposit  interest rate < -5, 0 otberwise.
Trade dummy  values:  1 = strongly  outward  oriented,  2 = moderately  outward  oriented,  3 = moderately  inward  oriented,  4
2= strongly  inward  oriented.
* Only  developing  countries  are included.42
III. Conclusion
This paper presented a research agenda designed to identify  the importance of national
policies  for long-run  growth.
After  documenting  the growth  experience  of developing  countries  over the past 25 years  and
discussing  the importance  of research  that dissects  the effects  of national policies  on growth  for the
World Bank, we construct an analytical  framework  that yields empirically  testable predictions
regarding  the affect  of fiscal  policy,  monetary  policy,  trade policy,  domestic  financial  policics,  and
policies  toward1  direct foreign  investment  on the rate of per capita income growth. The analytical
framework  higkdights  the potential importance  of interactions  among policies  and the effects of
uncertainty  regarding  these national policies. For example,  a decrease in tax rates on financial
intermediaries  imay  have different implications  for growth  in a country  with a well-developed  tax
system  from a country  with a debilitated  tax  system;  uncertainty  about monetary  policy  may  not onky
alter investment  incentives,  but the effect  of this  uncertainty  on the level  and form of investment  may
depend  importantly  on policies  toward  financial  markets. In addition  to emphasizing  the importance
of analyzing  interactions  among  policies,  the analytical  framework  distinguishes  two channels  via
which  policies  influence  growth:  by affecting  incentives  to invest in human  and physical  capital  and
by affecting  the efficiency  with which  inputs are allocated. For example,  trade intervention  and
restrictive  policies  on direct foreign  investment  may  importantly  distort the sectors toward  which
resources  are allocated  in ways  that reduce  productive  efficiency  and growth. In addition,  fiscal  policy
may  directly  tax the accumulation  of physical  and human  capital,  so that economies  accumulate  less
physical  and human  resources,  lowering  the rate of economic  development. Thus, this framework
provides  a rich array of empirical  predictions  regarding  the complex  relationship  between national
policies  and long-run  growth.
The paper goes on to describe  how  to examine  empirically  the predictions  of the analytical
framework We provide  a list of data sources,  discuss  alternative  measures  of national  policies,  and
document  a series  of cross-sectional  and pooled  cross-section,  time-series  techniques  that would  help
uncover  important  links  between  national  policies  and  long-run  growth. We believe  that results  from
conducting  the research  suggested  in this  paper  would  help  policy  makers  design  policy  packages  that
promote  improvements  in human  welfare  over the next  decades.43
APPENDIX I
BRIEF SURVEY OF EMLIRICAL  AND THEORETICAL LfTERATURE ON GROWrH
The formal  study  of economic  growth  and the public  policies  necessary  to encourage sustained
increases in output began over three hundred years ago.55 Indeed much of the recent work on
growth can be viewed as refining and formalizing  the basic economic insights of classical  and
development  economists. For example,  the organizing  theme of John Stuart Mill's Priciples  of
Political  Eoonlg  (1848)  is a production  function  based on land,  labor, capitaL  and the productivity
of these inputs. He notes that the "increase  of production  ... is a result of the increase of the finputsJ
themselves,  or of their productiveness."" Using the simplifying  assumptions  of constant returns to
scale,  diminishing  returns to each factor, and the existence  of exogenous  factors such as land,  labor,
and  productiveness,"  Solow  (1956),  Swan (1956),  Cass  (1965),  and Koopmans (1965) tumed Mill's
framework  into one of economics'  major  theoretical  paradigms:  the neoclassical  growth  modeL The
"new"  growth  literature builds  on the neoclassical  growth  model  by  examining  the implications  of scale
economies,  externalities,  and by makdng  technology,  labor,  and human  capital endogenously  produced
inputs.
This review  follows  a thin and selective  thread from the major classical  economists  to the
neoclassical  growth  model  to the endogenous  growth  models  of the last five  years. We also note the
contributions of development economists to the study of growth.  Indeed, many development
economists  moved  away from the neoclassical  growth model for the same reasons that the "new"
growth  economists  modified  it: the neoclassical  growth  model failed to explain important aspects  of
economic  development.?
The neoclassical  growth model provided  a framework  for the growth accounting  literature's
attempts to  quantify the contribution to growth of each physical input and "productiveness."
Analyses  by Norsworthy  (1984),  Chenery et al. (1986),  and Maddison  (1987) suaggest  that physical
factor inputs account for only 50-70 percent of the growth rate of output.  Although there are
arguments  as to the precise  percentage (see:  Jorgenson,  Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987)  and Baily  and
Schultze (1990)] and  the  accuracy of  growth accounting procedures  [see  Nelson  (1981)],
"productiveness"  or technological  change as it is currently termed appears to be  an important
component  of growth. Interestingly,  John Stuart Mill  seems to have predicted this finding,  arguing
that ultimately  the key to increasing  per capita  output is "improvements  in the productive  arts." Since
the neoclassical  growth  model assumes  that the rate of technological  change is given  exogenously,  it
does not provide  a useful framework  for understanding  the economic  forces and policies  behind an
important  component  of growth:  technological  change.5 9
5 Sir Wiiam Petty  (1676),  for =uaple, meaured,  compared,  and  discused  hages in the  standards  of ivng in Fmnce  and England
Oued  from Abamovitz  (1989)  p. 13  with the ful quote on pap S.
s7The  complaint  that  the "nee powth  teratu  is not rally  new, and  does not adequately  ac_owedge the contributkm of the
davdopmet Utertum  ha considerable  justifiston.  This  in itaelf  does  not lessen  the usefuln  of the neW models  for studying  gzwb
in developing  countries.
5 The  pioneern  in this field  sre Abnmovltz  Dennison  Jorgenon and  1endrlrL  Also  se  the influential  work  of KulneLs  (1966).
5  Efforts were made  to bete  undennd  tehnolg  inwnovtion  within te  contes  of the neoodmmi gmwth  mod  by
conwasdeg  hsogm  ags  (Pabdnetd  (1962) and  Made and Hahn (1965)1  and by maldng  endogenous  the choie betwn  labor
and capiut sugmentin technological  innvto  (Kennedy  (1964)l.  See also Atkinson and Stlglitz (1969), Binanger  (1974),
Dasgupts nd Stiglitz  (1960).44
A limitation  of the neoclassical  growth model is that the steady  state per capita growth rate
is zero if the exogenously  given  rate of technological  change is set to zero.  The investment  share
does not affect steady  state growth  in the neoclassical  growth modeL Therefore, economic policy
does not influence  steady-state  growth;  economic  polizy  only affects  the level of economic  output or
the transition to the steady  state.  Since  King and Rebelo (1989) demonstrate  that interest rates in
many countries would have to be absurdly high for transitional  dynamics  to explain the observed
differences  in cross-country  growth  rates, the standard  neoclassical  growth  model  does not appear to
be the appropriate  model  for understanding  sustained  differences  in cross  country  growth  rates or the
growth  effects of policy. 0
Recent models  seek to extend the neoclassical  growth  model such that growth is responsive
to policy. Building  on work  by Arrow  (1962)  and Phelps  (1966),  Romer (1986)  makes  technological
change endogenous by assuming  that technology is a public good but that private investment in
capital increases the level  of technology  available  to all entrepreneurs. The externality  associated
with investment  overturns  the assumption  of diminishing  marginal  returns to investment  and yields
a production function  with increasing  returns to scale,  such that there is steady-state  growth  when
there is sufficient investment. In Romer's (1986) model a higher investment  rate will accelerate
economic  growth. Therefore,  economic  policies  that alter the investment  rate will affect economic
growth.61
Similarly,  Lucas (1988)  builds a model based on Uzawa (1962)  with increasing  retums that
arise from extemal effects  associated  with human capital. Lucas  emphasizes  that workers interact
with colleagues  such that each individual's  "productiveness'  depends  on the human  capital of others.
Thus, private investment  in human  capital  by an individual  increases  his own productiveness  but also
increases  the human  capital and productiveness  of othem  The externality  associated  with human
capital produces  an aggregate  production  function  that has increasing  returns to scale. The resulting
production  function implies  that if the economy  invests  a sufficient  amount of resources in human
capital  accumulation,  the economy  will  enjoy long-run  steady  state growth. Consequently,  alterations
in the incentives  to invest  in human capital have long-run  growth implications. The importance  of
human  capital in economic  development  has been the subject  of massive  theoretical and empirical
study.' 2
In the Romer  (1986)  and Lucas  (1988)  models,  policy  can reduce long-run  growth  by  impeding
investment  in human  and physical  capital so that the rate of technological  advancement  or human
capital  accumulation  slows. In addition,  because  there are externalities  to human  and physical  capital
investment  in these models,  appropriate public policies  can help private agents intemalize these
extemalities  and thereby  accelerate  long-run  growth. Thus, the overall policy  regime of a country,
including  taxes, property rights, and macroeconomic  distortions,  can alter savings  and investment
allocation  decisions  in ways  that alter long-run  growth. Nevertheless,  policy  can only have growth
'Mankiw  et aL (1990)  fnd a  ae  role for trarsitional  dynamko  in the neoclil  model by asuming a much  hlgher capal
shae (induding human  capital).
6' In a different  model Scott (1969)  thu  ta  the act of  inemet  Itself cate  new investment  opportunitka  Therfce,
incremagn  invment  cn hve dynanic effect that rais the ewcWy  growth  t  ate.
62 See, for  example.  theotical  tratments by Schultz (1961, 1963), Beck  (1964), and Ben-Porath (1967).  M  _cconomic
evidence  is pmvided by Pscharpoulos (1985),  Jamuo and LAu  (1982)  and  Grilkim (1964, 1977). Roaenhweig  and Evens  (1977),
pAenzweig  and Schultz  (1963),  and Psampoulo  and Aniapda (1986) conduct  detaileds  caminations of the effoe  of human
capital  auumulaton  in deveong  coutri,  ad  DeTray  (1967) stude  the Implkatiocs  of govanment  policy. Lau,  Jamme  and
LAt  (1990) empiresiy asmine the rale of education  in developing  countria  qsin  an agpgte  production  *untio  approach
Also.  see the mviews  by Schultz  (1968)  and Psahrpoula  (1988)  Funher  work  is being  done for the World Development  Report
1991.4S
effects in these models if there are externalities  to  investment.  Recent empirical attempts at
identifying  external  effects associated  with investment  in physical  or human  capital have had some
success,  but the findings  have been challenged.°
In  attempting to  understand the economic forces  and  public policies that  influence
technological  advancement,  recent work has also followed  Schumpeter  (1911,  1942)  who argued  that
invention - the advancement of knowledge -and innovation - the implementation of such knowledge -
depend on the lure of profits. In terms of invention,  the energizing  role of monopolistic  profits and
market scale is the central component  of Romer's (1987,  1990)  recent characterization  of economic
growth." The invention of new technologies  increases  the productive capabilities  of the economy,
while the technolog producer  receives monopolistic  profits. Since  technolog is invented by profit
maximizing  firms,  public  policies  regarding  patents, property  rights,  and taxes  influence  the allocation
of resources to the invention  of new techn  clogies&' t
In  terms of innovation, Schmitz (1989) formalizes the economic incentives behind the
adoption of technology  for productive  endeavors  and the adaption of the technology  for particular
enviromnents. Since many  developing  countries  do not enjoy a comparative  advantage  in inventing
new technologies,  carefully  studying  the economic incentives  and public policies underlying the
exploitation and adoption of existing  technologies  for domestic  commercial  purposes seems to be
particularly  relevant."  It seems clear that a country's overall policy  regime will  affect the rate of
economic innovation by altering the incentives  underlying  the adoption of new technologies  for
production.' 7
These 'new'  growth models provide a  rich environment in which to study the role of
government. Not surprisingly,  these models  yield policy  conclusions  that are similar  to many  classical
and development economists. Economists  since John Stuart Mill have argued that if there are
externalities  associated  with investment  in physical  and human capital or if there is clear need for
public goods, the government  can have beneficial growth effects by supporting the provision  of
services  whose social benefits exceed private benefits, such as education and scientific  research.
Many economists  have argued the importance of secure property rights to promote savings  and
investment,  the need for institutions  to support economic  activity  on a large  scale,  and the desirability
that taxes not be overly  burdensome,  arbitrary,  or distortionary.0
Within the context of simple endogenous growth models, Rebelo (1991) exemplifies  the
effects  of taxation  on growth. However,  modelling  and measuring  the full  complexities  of fiscal  policy
° Ssee Romer  (1987).  Benhabib  and  Jovanovic  (1989).  Scott  (1989),  and  Caballeo and Lyons  (1989).
64  Romes  wort buikds  on models  by Shel (1967),  and Ethler (1982)
'5 Sdcookdr (1966)  as  focused  on the endogno  ction  of techology. Empirial studie of technolgical  chge  hawe  beet
conducted  by Nismimi and Pap (1966)  and  Nhimizu and  Robinson  (1986).
* May ecoonwis  hae studied  the  adaptation  of technologies  ceted  by Industralized  economies  by developing  countriL Blis
(1969)  rvies  the role  of trade  in tanfering  technooes  intemrtioal;  Caroso and Dormbusch  (1969)  discus the roe of private
capital  non  in diffusing  newd  while Holkin  (1989) swveys the liteature on tnmntionl  corpotions,  direct forei
nestment Nd the  dapgatla of tecnoo  internationally.  For some  alternative  viewpoints  on adaptation  and innoation, see KMal
(1960) Reuberg  (1990),  Frna  (1986),  Lii (1990),  and  Baumol  (1989).
a  See  Grsman  and Helpman  (1915h,b).
6 See Mill  (194&  p. 948), Samueson  (1954),  and  Atkion  ad  Stiglitz  (1980)
6 Morris  and  Adelman  (1988),  Olson (1982),  and North  (1989)  discuss  the role of institutions  in economic  developmenL46
is difficult  even  within  the simple  models  of the "new'  growth literature. Some  of these complexities
have  recently  been captured by Barro (1990)  and Easterly  (1990b). On one hand, governments  may
provide  growth-promoting  public  goods  and  design taxes  to close the gap between  private and social
costs. On the other hand, governments  may  waste funds,  funnel resources to endeavors  that do not
encourage growth, and impose taxes and regulations that distort private decisions. Aggregate
measures of government size will not capture the important implications  of where government
expenditures are allocated and whether these expenditures  are efficiently  transformed  into public
goods and services. Furthermore,  even if government  funds are always  spent efficiently  on growth-
promoting goods, there may be complex, non-linear tradeoffs between the beneficial effects of
government  services  and the deleterious  implications  of distortionary  taxes. Growth  increases  with
taxation and well-focussed  government expenditures at  low levels and  then decreases as the
distortionary  effects  of taxation  exceed the beneficial  effects of public  goods. Linear, cross-country
regressions  will  not appropriately  capture these relationships.
Empirically,  large cross-country  regressions  have begun to identify empirical ties between
aggregate  measures  of fiscal  policy  and growth  although the results are not yet conclusive.'* Barro
(1991)  finds that government  consumption  expenditures  less defense and education  payments  seem
to be negatively  related to growth. In addition,  Levine and Renelt (1990a) identify  specifications
when government  expenditures  on capital goods,  education,  defense spending,  and measures  of tax
sources and deficits  enter as suggested  by theory. But, because these results are sensitive  to the
"other  variables'  included  in the regression  and the time-period  over which  the analysis  is conducted,
more empirical  work is needed to sort-out the relationships  between aggregate  measures  of fiscal
policy  and growth."
In the area of trade policy,  Adam Smith  (1776)  argued that international  trade may  enhance
productivity  by allowing  economic  pla; .rs to specialize  in activities that would be unprofitable in
smaller  markets  and by allowing  countries  to exploit  economies  of scale in their areas  of comparative
advantage. These  ideas  were further  developed  by  Mill  (1848)  and Schumpeter (1911,  1942),  and the
relationship  between trade, economies  of scale, and growth has been studied extensively.' Within
the context of "new"  growth models,  Rivera-Batiz  and Romer (1989)  and Grossman  and Helpman
(1989a.b)  have constructed  endogenous  growth  models  in which openness to international  trade can
accelerate technological  improvements  by increasing  the size of the market available  to technology
producers and allowing  those countries with a comparative  advantage  in technology  production to
specialize in this key industry. Similarly,  Krueger (1974), Grossman and Helpman (1989b), and
Murphy,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1990)  argue that trade distortions  may divert talented people out of
productive activities  and into rent-seeking  endeavors  that slow technological  innovation. On the
other hand, Krugman  (1988)  notes that externalities  in human capital  accumulation  can  overturn the
typical  positive  effects  of trade. Opening to trade could induce a country to specialize  in activities
with small external human capital effects. Such a country could be better off in autarky where
domestic  production  includes  goods  with more  significant  extemalities  although  the reverse  could  also
be true.
1e  See Landau  (I983, 1966),  Baum (1989),  Romer  (1989), Entely and Wetd  (1989), Kormendi  and  Meuim (198),  Orer and
TuDock  (1989),  DIamond  (1969),  Ram  (1985),  and Koeter and Kormendi  (1989).
71  For a dead  disdm  of pat  empuind work on poliy  and gwwb  ad  for recoamedatioas  on  bow to impoe  the dedp
and impkmcntatio  of cut  orOty  grwh  studi  se  Levine and React  (1990b).
n See  Kuzac (1960),  Bab=  (1965),  Dcniaon  (1967),  Cordes (1971),  and Tybout,  de Melo,  and Corbo (1990).47
The empirical ties between trade and growth, however, are mixed.  Large multicountry-case
studies document generally favorable linkages between trade liberalization and growth.'  Empirical
studies that attempt to relate continuous, objective, internationally comparable measures of trade
policy with  growth, however, have thus far met with only mixed success.' 4 Levine and  Renelt
(1990a) find a two-step relationship between trade and growth: the share of trade in GDP is reliably
positively correlated with the share of investment in GDP which is itself reliably correlated with
growth, but  the trade share is not  independently correlated with growth if one  controls for the
investment share.  More detailed empirical studies might be better able to elucidate the ties between
trade policy and growth.
Direct foreign investment has received less attention  than trade  in the growth literature.
Findlay  (1978) studies the effects of policies restricting direct foreign investments and international
capital flows  in a standard growth model. This is extended to an endogenous growth model in Wang
(1990).  More general discussions  of policies toward direct foreign investment are provided in the
books by Wallace (1990), Cable and  Persaud (1987), and  Moran  (1986), and  in  the survey by
Helleiner (1989).
Just as governments  may  resort to taxes  on trade to raise revenues, governments often finance
expenditures via money creation and taxes on financial market activities.  The  role of money in
economic activity is one  of  the  most frequently studied  issues in  economics./5  Cross-country
empirical studies that use measures of average inflation rates, MI growth, domestic credit creation,
and the standard deviations of inflation MI growth, and domestic credit creation have thus far met
with mixed results in identifying  strong ties between these measures of monetary policy and growth."
Since the negative effects of inflation on growth may be non-linear in the sense that it may take very
high inflation rates to interfere with economic activity, additional empirical studies of the growth
effects of inflationary finance could be a profitable area of inquiry.
The theoretical links between financial markets and growth are also strong.  Schumpeter
(1911) argued that well-functioning  capital markets were necessary if entrepreneurs  were going to
raise capital for new technology-improving  projects, and this theme was echoed and extended by
McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and  many others.7  Recent  efforts  by Levine  (1990, 1991) at
examining financial policies in an endogenous growth model similarly  demonstrate  the potentially
harmful effects on  growth of taing  financial market activities.  Empirically, Goldsmith (1969),
McKinnon (1973), and  Gelb  (1989) find a  positive relationship between  measures of  domestic
financial market activity  and growth; however, the direction of causality has not been established.
n See Krueger (1978), Bhagti  (1978), Balana and Asociates (1982), and the World Bank (1987).
74  Neptive  effecs  of trade intervention have been identified by Kruegr (1983), Hnylyshyn  (1985), Edwards  (1989), and DoUar
(1990), but  Pack (1988), Pritchet  (forthcoming), Rodrik (1988), and Levine and Rencit (1990a) question the strength of  these
finding.  See also Rower (1990), Balass (1978, 1985), Tyler (1985), Feder (1983), Kavoussi  (1984), Ram (1985). Moschos (1989),
World Bank Denvopmet Report (1987),  and DeLong and Summet (1990).
75  See the ctensve  aview  by Orphanides and Solow  (1990).
76  See Fiscber (1983), Grier and TNUock  (1989), Kormendi  and Meguire  (1985), and Levine  and Renelt (1990a).
77  On capiwl market in debvoping counties  see Von Pisdfh  et.  t.  d(1983),  Bardhan and Sinhvan  (1971), Bverman  aDd
Srinin  (1981), Brraerman ad  Stiglitz  (1982), and the review  by Benl  (1988).48
In sum, this brief review of t`"'  -rowth literature raises at least four important themes.'
First, the broad forces behind econom,. growth -accumulation of produced factors, sperialization,
economies of scale, and  externalities - vere sketched-out  by the  classical economists long ago.
Second, these same forces have been used by the development literature to study various aspects of
economic growth.  Third, by building on the insights of growth and development economists, the
"new" theoretical literature  on growth is also contributing models that  identify specific channels
through which national policies may have effects on long-run growth rates.  Fmally, the empirical
work on linking national policies to growth is still evolving, and many  basic issues regarding the long-
run relationship between policy and growth - including the effects on growth of government size, the
allocation of public expenditures, the financing of fiscal  expenditures, trade policy, and international
capital flows - remain to be more conclusively  resolved. There seem to be important opportunities
to evaluate empirically  the theoretically predicted channels from policy to growth by improving the
design of cross-country growth studies and by conducting more detailed longitudinal case studies.
7" We should emphuize again the narrow sectivity  of thi  meview,  and for that matter, of  the "new" gowtb  iiteWtumW  For
xmnple,  impontnt  15mm  such  as income distribution [Kuznets  (1956.57), Adelman and Monis  (1973), Robinon (1976), Nedo
(1981), Sen (1981ab),  Kanbur (1987), Adelman and Robinson (1978)1,  hbeath  and nutrition (Selony  and Taylor (1973), Stipz
(1976), LAu,  lin,  Yotopoulb (1978), Bliss  and Stem (1978), and Bebrmn and Deoalikar (1987, 1988)1,  and  the structural evolutio
of econoia  le(Kuzneu  (1966), Taylor  (1%9, 1983), Chenery and Taylor (1968)1,  have not yet received  much attention  by the "nw
grawth  literature.49
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